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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the possibilities and limitations of the EU‟s approach to promote democratic 
reforms in Ukraine in the period since the adoption of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan in February 
2005. The Action Plan was agreed within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy.    
The main focus of the thesis is on the Ukrainian national conditions, which are viewed as variables 
that may facilitate or restrict the implementation of the reforms. The reforms in question are those 
that should contribute to further strengthening of the stability and effectiveness of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, which is a part of the Copenhagen political criteria.  
The analysis of the pace of progress in implementation of the reforms in Ukraine has shown that 
Ukraine has moved forward in some areas, but a lot remains to be done yet. In order to find 
explanations of the lack of the progress, the theoretical framework of International Socialisation 
has been chosen. The insights from the Complex Socialization model (Trine Flockhart) have been 
supplemented with the propositions elaborated by Jeffrey T. Checkel, Frank Schimmelfennig and 
with the elements from the theory of political culture developed by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney 
Verba. 
The analysis of the national context in order to reveal its facilitating and restricting role has been 
composed of the discussion of the attractiveness of the EU‟s offers for the Ukrainian political elites 
and the society at large, the degree of legitimacy of the EU‟s requirements, the characteristics of 
political structures and processes at the level of political elites, the strength of the European 
identification of the Ukrainian society, the participation traditions and the civil society in Ukraine.  
The general conclusion of the study is that the national context hides both possibilities and 
limitations for the EU‟s approach to strengthen the stability and effectiveness of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law in Ukraine, but the limitations prevail.   
         
 
 6 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AP: EU-Ukraine Action Plan 
AsA: Association Agenda 
BYuT: Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko 
CMU: Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
CPU: Communist Party of Ukraine 
CS: EU Common Strategy towards Ukraine  
DFID: UK Department for International Development      
EaP: Eastern Partnership 
ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy 
ENPI: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
EU: The European Union 
FTA: Free Trade Area 
GRECO: Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption 
IDEA: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
IS: International Socialization  
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation  
NIS: New Independent States 
ODIHR: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
OSCE: The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PCA: EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement  
PoR: Party of Regions 
SCMU: Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
SIT: Social Identity Theory  
TAIEX: Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument 
 
 7 
1. PRESENTING THE PROBLEM  
 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have promised a new surge for 
democracy development. European international organisations declared their will and commitment 
to promote democracy in all of Europe. They have designed various institutional arrangements and 
programmes to assist democratic transformation and consolidation in the former communist 
countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. Initially there was a tremendous optimism about the 
establishment of democracy in the post-communist countries. But today, two decades after the 
historical events changed the political map of Europe, the initial optimism has been substituted 
with cautiousness. Democratisation has showed to be not an easy task.  
There are notable differences in the way post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
have developed politically, economically and socially. Some of them (especially Central European 
and Baltic states) have shown a remarkable democratic progress. They quickly and smoothly 
implemented democratic reforms, and today are widely regarded as consolidated democracies. 
Others seem to get entangled in the complex process of democracy building, moving uncertainly 
forward and back. Most former republics of the Soviet Union are on their way to develop 
autocratic or authoritarian rather than democratic systems.  
It is of no surprise that these so different developments evoked a huge interest among scholars to 
study processes of democratic transformations. A growing body of the academic literature 
investigates issues of democratic transition and conditions propitious for success of 
democratisation trying to explain successes and reversals of democratisation processes. As regards 
post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe different reasons have been given to 
explain the differences in the pace of democratic transformations in the region, such as earlier 
experiences with democracy, better economic performance, less oppressive political system under 
the communist rule, favourable political culture, as well as international influences on domestic 
changes.  
The study of the international organizations as socializing agencies has gained impetus in the last 
decade with the publishing of the seminal book by Samuel Huntington (1991) in which 
international rather than domestic factors have been identified as the main cause of contemporary 
democratization. Since then more and more attention has been paid to the role of international 
actors in advancing democratic transformations. Recent studies examine international organisations 
as promoters of democratic norms and principles (Schimmelfenning et al. 2006; Pevehouse 2005; 
Flockhart 2005; Checkel 2005). 
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Scholars reach different conclusions regarding the role of international organisations on domestic 
change. Some argue that international organisations have an indirect and insignificant influence on 
democratic transitions (O‟Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). Others question this 
conclusion giving the international organisations a more prominent role in transition and 
endurance of democracy (Pridham & Vanhannen 1994, Pridham et al. 1997, Whitehead 1996). 
Though, international organisations may also not consolidate or encourage democracy (Pevehouse 
2005). Thus, the question is not whether international organisations matter for democratisation at 
the national level, but how and under which conditions they can be effective in promoting 
domestic change. This process has been conceptualized as a process of international socialization 
leading to internalization of democratic norms and creation of new identities (Flockhart 2005; 
Checkel 2005; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006).  
 
Ukraine is an example of a former soviet republic, where the prospects for democratisation were 
good in the beginning of the 1990s. The later transformation process turned out to be problematic. 
And despite the fact that Ukraine has often been designated as a democracy, the political 
developments under the president Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) went more in the direction of an 
authoritarian regime rather than a liberal democracy. Many observers and researchers began to 
doubt whether the political regime in Ukraine can be on the whole regarded as a democracy. Such 
notions as electoral democracy (Kubicek 2001), electoral authoritarianism (D‟Anieri 2001), competitive 
authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way 2002), and neo-patrimonialism (Zimmer 2008) have been used to 
describe the political system in Ukraine.     
This development surprisingly culminated into a peaceful revolt against the all-penetrating 
corruption and election fraud in the winter 2004 – the so called Orange Revolution. The Orange 
Revolution, which after several reruns of the elections, finally brought Viktor Yushchenko to the 
presidency of Ukraine in January 2005, has been regarded as an expression of popular affirmation 
of the country‟s democratic choice. This raised high expectations that liberal, European democracy 
will finally take roots in Ukraine. But the revolution has been followed by one political crisis after 
another, creating a vast disappointment among population with the political developments in the 
country.  
Ukraine declared its wish to participate in the European cooperation already in December 1990, 
when then the parliament adopted a resolution, in which the Ukrainian government was ordered to 
apply its efforts to ensure direct participation of Ukraine in the general European process and 
European structures. Relations between Ukraine and the European Union were established in 
December 1991 and in March 1993 the negotiations on the Agreement on Partnership and 
Cooperation (PCA) between Ukraine and the EC were initiated.  
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Since 1993, the full-fledged membership of the EU has been a strategic foreign policy goal of 
Ukraine. This goal was repeated by Ukraine‟s first president, Leonid Kravchuk, when the PCA was 
signed on 14 June 1994 in Luxembourg. Due to the long process of ratification, the PCA entered 
into force almost four years later, on 1 March 1998. The respect of democratic principles of the 
rule of law, respect for human rights, the establishment of a multiparty system with free and 
democratic elections constitute core element of the agreement.  
Ukraine expected that its membership aspirations would be explicitly recognised by the EU at the 
Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the main discussion topic of which was preparation 
for the future enlargement with the CEC. Though, the EU restricted itself to acknowledgement of 
Ukraine‟s European aspirations and welcomed Ukraine‟s pro-European choice in the subsequently 
adopted Common Strategy1 (CS) on Ukraine. In accordance with the CS, one of the EU‟s strategic 
goals towards Ukraine was to contribute to the emergence of a stable, open and pluralistic 
democracy governed by the rule of law and underpinning a stable market economy (European 
Council 1999).  In contrast to the PCA, which was mostly focused on regulation of the EU‟s 
relations with Ukraine, the CS for the first time clearly identifies the emergence of a stable, open 
and pluralistic democracy as a priority of the EU‟s approach towards Ukraine.  
The dramatic events of the Orange revolution were preceded by the Eastern enlargement in May 
2004, which meant that the external borders of the EU have changed. This necessitated the 
development of the EU‟s position towards its neighbours. The position was formulated in the 
communication on Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A new Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
Neighbours in 2003 and launched as a European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. The ENP 
declared the aim to develop a zone of prosperity and stability - “a ring of friends”, which is to be 
achieved through the transfer of “the EU's fundamental values” (European Commission 2003 and 
2004).  
On 7 May 2009 at the summit in Prague the EU launched a new initiative – The Eastern 
Partnership (EaP), which represents a specific Eastern dimension within the ENP. It is directed at 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus2, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Values of democracy, the rule of 
law and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as market economy, 
sustainable development and good governance are the core elements of the EaP. The EaP is 
complimentary to the existing bilateral contractual relations and is governed by the principles of 
differentiation and conditionality.  
                                               
1 Common Strategy was introduced as a new instrument of the EU‟s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
2 Depending on the development of its relations with the EU. 
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The main goal of the EaP is defined as “to support political and socio-economic reforms of the partner 
countries, facilitating approximation towards the European Union” in order “to create the necessary conditions to 
accelerate political association and further economic integration” (Prague Eastern Partnership Summit 2009). 
The EaP underlines the need to maintain and bolster the need for reforms in the Eastern countries.   
The ENP and the EaP are based on the conditionality mechanism successfully applied in the 
process of enlargement. The only difference is that they do not envisage any membership 
perspective for the neighbouring countries (see paragraph 4.1 and 4.2).  
The EU has played an important role in democratising the former communist countries of the 
Central and Eastern Europe that are now fully established democracies. The democratisation 
process in Ukraine can hardly be defined as smooth and totally successful. In May 2009, the 
European Commission noted in its assessment report that despite some overall progress “Ukraine 
made no or only limited progress in the implementation of some key political reform measures including constitutional 
and judicial reform and efforts to combat corruption” (European Commission 2009).  
The question is whether the EU is able to play the same role in Ukraine?  Can the approach laid in 
the ENP promote democratic transformations in Ukraine? Can the ENP be regarded as an 
important facilitating factor in advancing democratic reforms in Ukraine? Or is the influence of the 
EU only marginal and is it actually the national conditions that are decisive for success of 
democratisation?  
 
Answers to these questions require a detailed analysis of the linkages between the democratisation 
approach employed by the EU and the national context for establishment of democracy. These 
questions lead to formulation of the main question of this thesis:  
 
In terms of national conditions, what are the possibilities and limitations of the EU’s 
approach to promote democratic reforms in Ukraine? 
 
The answer of the main question will be guided by the following research questions: 
1. What are the main elements and mechanisms of the EU‟s approach to promote democratic 
reforms in Ukraine? 
2. What are the specific requirements of the EU in respect to democratic reforms in Ukraine? 
3. Has there been any progress in implementation of the required democratic reforms in 
Ukraine since the adoption of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan in 2005? 
4. Do the EU‟s offers live up to the expectations of the Ukrainian political elites and society? 
5. How important are the EU‟s priority requirements for the Ukrainian population? 
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6. What characterises the political structures and processes in Ukraine? 
7. To what extent does the Ukrainian society identify itself and being European?  
8. What are the characteristic traits of the Ukrainian participation traditions and civil society?      
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2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
2.1 Central definitions 
2.1.1 International socialization 
International socialization (IS) is one of the central notions used in the thesis and various 
definitions can be found (for example Schimmelfenning et al. 2006, Checkel 2005, Risse et al. 1999, 
Flockhart 2005). I depart from the existing definitions and define IS as “a process in which states are 
induced to adopt the constitutive norms and rules of an international community.” In this thesis this process 
refers to inducing Ukraine into the constitutive democratic norms and rules of the European 
Union.     
 
2.1.2 Democratic reforms 
The notion democratic reforms is used throughout the thesis. I define this notion as the 
strengthening of the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, as it is 
defined in official documents that regulate EU-Ukraine relations in this respect. The precise 
elements are identified in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan (AP) and further specified in the 
Association Agenda (AsA) (for details see paragraph 4.4). 
 
2.1.3 Political elites 
Elites are commonly defined as “small groups of people who exert substantial power and influence over the 
public and over political outcomes”(Smelser & Baltes 2004). Their power can be based on possession and 
control of various resources, such as economic, control of organisation, political support etc. There 
are different types of elites in contemporary society, for example, political leaders, the heads of the 
state bureaucracy, the military and the judiciary, key media people, businessman, the intellectual and 
cultural elite, leaders of civil society etc. Some elites can hold power at the national level, others 
only in some sectors or localities.    
When I refer to political elites in this thesis, I refer to those elites who hold power at the national level, i.e. 
political parties and their leaders. This choice is determined by the fact that these elites exert the 
strongest influence on the process of implementation of democratic reforms in Ukraine.    
 
2.1.4 Political culture 
The concept of political culture has no agreed definition. There is a variety of definitions, which 
accentuate different aspects of the notion. Though, most agree on the underlying principle that 
culture matters. There is also a broad agreement that “cultural orientations and norms are the product of a 
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shared history of socialization constituting an essential part of a person‟s social identity, and that this identity is as 
such fairly resistant to change” (Wegener 2003:207). 
In this thesis I talk about political culture of a nation and employ the approach of political science 
and not the anthropological one.  I use definition introduced by Almond & Verba, who define 
political culture of a nation as “the particular patterns of orientation toward political objects among members 
of a nation” and as “internalized in the cognitions, feelings and evaluations of its population” (Almond & Verba 
1989:13).  My underlying assumption is that political culture is learned in a process of political 
socialization and that it is historically conditioned, and closely related to a nation‟s international 
environment, institutional and social issues, economic development and national traditions. I treat 
political culture at the level of political system and political process (cf. chapter 3).   
 
2.1.5 Neo-patrimonial state 
Neo-patrimonial state is defined as a state “characterized by the formal, yet not factual separation of private 
and public spheres”. (Zimmer 2008:276-277)  
   
2.2 Choice of theory 
In this paragraph I will elaborate on the choice of a theoretical framework to answer the research 
question of the thesis.  
In order to answer the title question of this study, I have chosen a theory of IS represented by the 
Trine Flockhart (2005), Schimmelfennig et al. (2006). This theoretical approach is chosen because it 
gives the possibility to combine both international and national factors in analysing democratic 
transformations. And this is necessary to answer the research question. 
The theory of IS is a unique theoretical approach which combines elements from three research 
areas: enlargement (studies of EU enlargement), transition (national political transformations in 
former soviet republics) and europeanization (studies of the impact of the EU‟s institutions and 
policies on the national level).      
Complex Socialization model developed by Trine Flockhart (2005) offers a structural framework 
for analysing the transfer of norms through processes of international socialization which may 
cause changes in behaviour and possibly in the identity and basic values of the target state. 
Complex Socialization model allows for easy identification of causes of slow or rapid socialization 
through examining which of the model‟s elements is causing success or failure of socialization 
process. The model provides framework for analysing the national context as an important 
determinant factor for implementation of democratic norms.  The EU cannot force the state to 
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democratize, and its efforts can only be successful if there is a will to democratize internally in the 
state.  
The IS theory is supplemented with the elements from the theory on political culture developed by 
Almond & Verba (1989) in order to better understand participatory elements of the Ukrainian 
political culture.   
Thus, the chosen theories combine three meta theoretic approaches: the neo-institutional, the 
historical institutionalism and the rational choice. The neo-institutional approach stresses the 
importance of the institutions in shaping social action. Historical institutionalism underlines the 
impact of traditions, values and norms, deep ingrained rules and practices with determines the slow 
pace of change. And the rational choice approach builds on the assumption that all actors 
predominantly seek to maximise their benefits.          
 
2.3 Empirical sources 
The main types of empirical sources used in the thesis are the official documents and reports of the 
EU and other international organisations, Ukrainian official legislation and other relevant official 
documents, existing research materials in the area, public opinion surveys and the reliable internet 
sources. I use also my own insider experiences and knowledge as a person grown up in Ukraine.    
 
2.4 Strategy of analysis  
The aim of the analysis is to find out what are the possibilities and limitations of the EU‟s approach 
to promote democratic reforms in Ukraine. The strategy of analysis is illustrated in figure 1 below.  
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I will first look at the strategy elaborated by the EU to induce Ukraine to implement the required 
democratic reforms and identify its main characteristics. I will analyse the EU‟s requirements 
regarding democratic reforms in Ukraine and the benefits proposed by the EU if Ukraine fulfils the 
requirements.    
To find out whether Ukraine has been successful in implementation of the reforms, I will take a 
closer look at the progress of Ukraine‟s compliance with the requirements formulated by the EU 
since the adoption of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan in 2005.       
I will further search for explanations of this compliance or non-compliance by using the 
propositions from theories of IS (see paragraph 3.5). First, in order to find out what is the 
mobilising effect of the EU offers, I will look at the attractiveness of the EU‟s offers and their 
match with the expectations of the Ukrainian political elites and the society at large. Afterwards I 
will analyse whether the priorities for action as they have been defined by the EU coincide with 
those of the Ukrainian population. The aim of this analysis is to find out how legitimate the EU‟s 
demands are.  
Further, I will take a look on the characteristics of political structures and processes at the level of 
political elites. This will give the indication of the costs of implementation of the required reforms. 
The analysis of European identification of Ukrainian society will help to assess the degree of 
societal openness to the inputs from the EU.  The last element of the analysis will be devoted to 
the participation traditions and civil society in Ukraine.  
By analysing the interplay between the EU‟s approach to promote democratic reforms in Ukraine 
with the national characteristics of Ukrainian political elites and society, I will be able to answer the 
main question of the thesis. 
                  
2.5 Delimitations 
Due to the goals of this thesis I need to make following delimitations:  
 
2.5.1 The EU as agent of IS 
International institutions can be viewed as agents of IS and as sites of IS (Checkel 2007: 245). In 
this thesis I will focus on the EU as agent of IS. This is explained by that fact that Ukraine is not a 
member-state of the EU and thus does not fully participate in the work of the EU institutions. 
Even though, the level of contacts with the EU on different levels (political and expert) has 
intensified since 2005, the EU cannot be regarded as a site for IS of Ukraine. Furthermore, 
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socialisation leading to changes in an individual‟s identity and preferences is a long-term process. It 
requires prolonged studies involving thorough qualitative studies. This is impossible to carry out 
for the purposes of this thesis due to limited time horizon for the research. 
 
2.5.2 Socialisation strategies  
The theory of IS has developed a number of propositions regarding the socializing strategies that 
can be used by the agents of socialisation to promote compliance. Due to the focus of this study 
on the national context, I delimit my analysis from discussion of the socialisation strategies.       
  
2.5.3 Normative discussion of democracy       
I will delimit from the normative discussion of what constitutes a genuine democracy. The focus of 
the thesis is on the priorities for actions as they are defined in the official EU documents regarding 
Ukraine.  
 
2.5.4 Ukrainian context  
I take uncritical position towards the EU‟s approach. I treat the EU‟s approach as constant and 
take the EU‟s declaration of intentions as they are. Instead, I focus on the Ukrainian domestic 
context as constraining structural factor for the achievement of the EU‟s ambitions of promoting 
democracy in Ukraine.     
 
2.5.5 The period examined  
The empirical analysis will cover the period from the launch of the ENP in 2003 and subsequent 
adoption of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan in 2005, which clearly defined promotion of democratic 
reforms in Ukraine as one of the EU‟s principal objectives in cooperation with Ukraine, up to the 
end of 2009. Though, the EaP which was launched in May 2009 and is still in its beginning phase 
of implementation will not be included into analysis. If necessary for comparative reasons, I will 
refer to the developments in the previous years.  
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2.6 Structure of the thesis  
The remainder of the thesis is structured in the following way.  
Chapter three introduces the theoretical framework on which the thesis is bases upon. The theory 
of IS will be presented. In particular, Complex Socialization model proposed by Trine Flockhart 
supplemented with insights from and Jeffrey T. Checkel‟s, Frank Schimmelfennig‟s research on IS 
as well as with the elements from the political culture theory (Almond & Verba) will be presented. 
The chapter ends with a detailed explanation of the operationalization of the theories. 
In chapter four the EU‟s approach towards promotions of democratic transformation will be 
presented. The EU‟s offers and requirements regarding democratic reforms will be determined.  
The dynamics of the undertaken transformations in Ukraine in respect to the EU‟s requirements 
will be looked at in chapter five. It will be shown whether Ukraine has implemented the necessary 
reforms and thereby complied with the requirements of the EU or not.  
Chapter six is devoted to the analysis of the attractiveness of the EU‟s offers for the Ukrainian 
elites and society. The level of coherence between the EU‟s requirements and those problem issues 
that are of priority importance for the Ukrainian society are discussed. Further, it contains the 
analysis of political structures and processes at the level of political elites, and of the specific 
features of the Ukrainian political culture and civil society.   
Chapter seven contains the conclusions of the thesis, where the research question will be 
answered.    
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
In the present chapter a theoretical framework for the later analysis will be presented. The 
theoretical framework to analyse possibilities and limits of the EU‟s approach to promote 
democratic reforms in Ukraine is based on Complex Socialization model proposed by Trine 
Flockhart (2005). Trine Flockhart‟s model will be supplemented with insights from and Jeffrey T. 
Checkel‟s (1999, 2005), Frank Schimmelfennig‟s (2006) research on IS as well as with the elements 
from cultural theory (Almond & Verba 1989). I will first describe the constitutive parts of the 
model and afterwards operationalize it in respect to the research question of the thesis.      
 
3.1 International socialization (IS) 
Different definitions of IS are applied.  Schimmelfenning et al. Define IS as “a process in which states 
are induced to adopt the constitutive rules of an international community.” (Schimmelfenning et al. 2006: 2). 
Checkel applies following definition of IS: “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given 
community. The outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms.” (Checkel 2007: 
5). Successful socialization implies a switch from the following a logic of consequences to a logic of 
appropriateness. Compliance is sustained over time and is independent from particular structure of 
material incentives or sanctions.  
Risse et al. and  Flockhart view IS as “induction of new members ... into the ways of behaviour that are 
preferred in a society” (Risse et al. 1999; Flockhart 2005: 15) This definition has two implicit 
presuppositions: (1) the unequal relationship between socializer and socializee, in which the 
socializer has, or believes to have, a greater knowledge of the norm set than socializee and has the 
power to judge socializee‟s conformity with the norm set; (2) the existence of a society with well-
entrenched rules and norms of proper behaviour, which membership is sought by an outsider. The 
ultimate goal of socialization process is the adoption and internalization of the norm set to an 
extent that external pressure is not needed to ensure compliance (Risse et al. 1999: 11; Flockhart 
2005: 16). In other words, the norm set becomes taken for granted by socializee (Johnston 2001: 
495). Though, this raises a question of how it is possible to know that norm set has been deeply 
internalized, because observable change in behaviour may as well be undertaken for strategic 
reasons, such as entry into community or gaining other benefits. What is possible to observe is 
whether socializee complies with the required norms (Checkel 1999). Thus, in this thesis 
compliance with the norm set in question will be the indicator of successful international 
socialization of the state.       
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3.2 Complex Socialization Model 
Trine Flockhart (2005) offers a Complex Socialization model which attempts to structure and take 
into account the significant factors that influence the outcome of the IS. The model determines 
self- and other-categorization processes as the primary factor for determining the outcome of IS 
process and renders other variables (such as socialization strategies, the nature of domestic 
structures, political processes, political culture at the domestic elite and mass levels, and the 
prospects for creating „winning coalitions‟ at both levels) as dependent on the initial self- and other-
categorization processes.    
The constituent parts of the Complex Socialization model are following (Flockhart 2005:44-46): 
1. Self- and other-categorization processes are important for the receptiveness to socialization 
and the willingness of the socializee to socialize. Self- and other-categorization processes 
represent the model‟s first „filter‟ between the international and domestic levels. These concepts 
are borrowed from Social Identity Theory (SIT).  
2. Socialization strategies of persuasion and social influence are borrowed from the field of 
social learning. 
3. Domestic structure: mass and elite level are distinguished as two separate „we-concepts‟, a 
state/elite and nation/people level, which may have different self- and other-categorization 
processes and different understandings about what constitutes a critical juncture. 
4. The domestic level „filters‟ are conceptualized as political structures and processes at the 
state/elite level, and political culture and participation traditions at the nation/people level. 
Complex Socialization is presented in the model (see annex 1) where four different „out-groups‟ of 
states are identified, which are likely to behave differently in relation to the socializing agent (the 
„in-group‟). The model has three levels separated by „filters‟ through which the process of IS takes 
place, as well as two strategies of socialization are identified (reinforcement (r) and persuasion (p)), 
which are influenced by the first „filter‟ of self- and other-categorization and which in their own 
turn influence the outcome of the IS process.  
 
Self- and other-categorization processes (1 filter)  
It is not the purpose of this paragraph to make a comprehensive discussion of the SIT and its 
origins. I will instead focus on its main provisions relevant for analysis of a state compliance with 
international norms.   
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SIT focuses on explaining why individuals find certain social groups and their norm set and identity 
more attractive than others and hence are more willing to change their behaviour in order to 
comply with the norm set of the social group to which they wish to belong.  
The central notion is SIT is “social group”. Social group provides norms and rules of proper 
attitudes and behaviour for its members. Furthermore, members of a social group share a common 
identity, in accordance to which they define themselves as a distinct social entity, ascribe value and 
emotional significance to group membership, and evaluate and compare their group with other 
social groups within a similar realm. Membership of a highly ranked social group gives higher self-
esteem to its individual members. (Flockhart 2005: 46).  
Furthermore, the importance of the social group for its members is demonstrated in positive 
distinctiveness of the social group for its members in relation to other social groups. Membership 
of at highly-ranked social group is connected with the self- and other-categorization process, in 
accordance to which members of the social group define their relationship and distance to other 
social groups in a similar realm, creating in this way a layered hierarchy of different social groups. 
This means that identity constructions are always relational. The important thing her is, that they 
are not just constructed in relation to “the other”, but in relation to other “we” entities. Thus, self- 
and other-categorization process consists of both definition of “the other”, that is what “the self” 
is not, and definition of the “significant we” or “in-group”, to which “the self” is striving 
towards. (Flockhart 2005: 47). 
Norm sets and group identities are stable and hard to change. Though, the existing norms and 
identities may change when a critical juncture or a destabilizing ideational shock has taken place, 
which has undermined the existing norm set and created an ideational vacuum or state of 
„normlessness‟ (Checkel 1999; Marcussen 2000; Risse et al. 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).  
This opens for the possibility for learning the norms of the “in-group”, to which the “out-group” 
wish to belong. In this situation it is necessary that specific norms are promoted by someone to be 
accepted and successfully internalized by socializee as conditions may be more or less favourable 
for norm promotion and reception. Thus, the success of socialization process is influenced by the 
degree of the socializee (“out-group”) identification with the norm-promoter (“in-group”) and vice 
versa, and the extension of this identification at the domestic level. SIT‟s proposition is that the 
most salient norms for the group members will be those found within their social group, and the 
preferred social group will be the most highly valued social group. (Flockhart 2005: 43-48). 
Schimmelfennig (2006) argues in line with SIT propositions, that a Western and European identity 
of the target government facilitates compliance, even if it can lead to the removal of the 
government from the power (Schimmelfennig 2006: 10). Though Schimmelfennig emphasises 
strategic approach (conditionality), he underlines that the success of IS depends not only on the 
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political cost-benefit calculations of the contemporary government (the size of domestic adaptation 
costs for complying) but also depends on the features of the future governments. He identifies 
three party constellations3 in the target states, which influence the process of IS in different ways: 
liberal, mixed and anti-liberal.   
In countries with liberal party constellation the process of IS is continuous and smooth. It results 
in high levels of compliance and rule adoption, because changes in government will always result in 
high identification levels with the “in-group”, commitment to integration and adoption of the 
liberal democratic norms4. One may speak about “self-socialization” in these countries with liberal 
party constellation, where socialisation efforts (conditionality) can be regarded as largely redundant.  
In countries with mixed-constellation5 there is no elite consensus on liberal democratic reform and 
European integration. The socialization process resembles a stop-and-go or up-and-down pattern 
as pro-reform governments being replaced by anti-reform governments. There is a possibility of 
successful IS in mixed-constellation countries if pro-reform government manages to carry out 
democratic reforms and to deepen European integration. Political conditionality plays an important 
role in this situation as it can help to consolidate the liberal forces (create winning coalitions) in the 
target-state, join their forces for the election as well as help preserve coalition after the elections. 
The attractiveness of European integration (a wish to become at part of the highly ranked “in-
group”) can facilitate continuity in winning government coalitions, thereby increasing the costs of 
the non-complying and losing benefits of integration, which may ultimately change the party 
constellation from mixed to liberal.  
In countries with anti-liberal6 party constellations socialization efforts have limited impact. 
(Schimmelfennig 2006: 10-12). 
Thus, self- and other-categorization (identification) represents the first “filter” in the Complex 
Socialization Model, which organizes social groups in the country into a system of hierarchically 
ordered “out-groups” and thereby determines the openness of the target state for socialization. 
Socialization is much more likely if ideational distance between in-group and out-group is small. 
(Flockhart 2005: 49-50; Schimmelfennig 2006: 10-12). Particular characteristics of the “out-groups” 
determine appropriate socialization strategies in respect to socializee (Flockhart 2005: 48).  
 
                                               
3 Party constellation is defined as “the major parties, which are able to form a government or will be dominant in any feasible coalition 
government” (Schimmelfennig 2006: 10).     
4 The examples of these countries are Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungry.  
5 For example, Baltic countries, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia (1996-2000).  
6 For example Belarus. 
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Socialization Strategies 
Socialization strategies chosen by socializing agent represent the second component of the 
Complex Socialization model. Flockhart (2005) stresses that socialization strategy employed in 
respect to target state may have significant importance for the outcome of the socialization process 
and choice of a socialization strategy is determined by the structural  position of the out-group 
(Flockhart 2005: 48).   
Socialization literature distinguishes between different socialization strategies: inclusive and 
exclusive, reinforcement/social influence and persuasion (Checkel 2005; Flockhart 2004 and 
2005; Johnston 2001; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006).  
As IS is a process in which norm is transferred from international to national level, it is necessary 
to examine the context into which the norms are attempted to be transferred. IS can only be 
effective if the norm is diffused into domestic society at both governmental (state/elite) and 
general mass public (nation/people) level. The next step is therefore look at the domestic structure.          
Domestic structure: state/elite and people/ nation levels   
The norm is successfully transferred if it has been accepted and stabilized through 
institutionalization at the domestic level of a given society. Domestic level in the complex 
Socialization model is conceptualized as consisting of formal and informal structures and political 
processes as a traditional “domestic structure”-approach7 suggests, as well as of two very differently 
constructed social groups: one located at the state level and consisting of the elite and government 
structures and the other one located at the nation level and consisting of the people. (Flockhart 
2005: 50).  
The distinction between state/elite and nation/people social groups is based on understanding the 
domestic level as consisting of two different social groups having different “we-concepts”, 
undergoing different self- and other-categorizations possibly resulting in different interests and 
political preference as well as conceptions of the in-group. Such a division allows for a bifurcation 
of causal dynamics, where different causal factors are important at each level8. This does not mean 
that the two different “we-concepts” will always result in two separate or even conflicting cultures; 
                                               
7 Studies in this direction are Evangelista, Matthew (1997) “Domestic Structure and International Change” in M. Doyle 
and G.J. Ikenberry (eds) New Thinking in International Relations Theory, Westview Press: Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1992) 
“Public Opinion, Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies”, World Politics, 3(4): 479-512, Risse-
Kappen, Thomas (1994) “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of 
Cold War”, International Organization, 48(2): 185-214.    
8 Such a bifurcation has been observed in the studies by Isaacs, Maxine (1998) “Two Different Worlds: the 
Relationship between Elite and Mass Opinion on American Foreign Policy”, Political Communication, 15 (3): 323-346 and  
Hedetoft, Ulf (2003) “Cultures of States and Informal Governance in the EU: an Exploratory Study of Elites, Power 
and Identity”, Series of Occasional Papers, European Research Unit, no. 35, Aalborg University, Denmark.      
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rather this might be relevant in respect to certain issues and norm sets and will impact the outcome 
of socialization of particular norms at domestic level.  
The prospects for successful socialization are good in the countries where orientations about what 
constitutes an in-group and where self- and other-categorization processes are likely to be similar at 
the two levels, while socialization will be more problematic in countries where orientations at 
state/elite and nation/people level are divided. 
Separating the domestic structure in two levels makes it possible to divide countries undergoing 
socialization in respect to a specific norm set in four different types of out-groups. Such a division 
is not a country-specific constant, but depends on the norm set in question. The processes of 
socialization of the each type of out-group will be different as well as socialization outcomes will 
vary in respect their success. (Flockhart 2005: 51). 
Successful socialization at the state/elite level does not necessarily mean a successful socialisation 
at the nation/people level. Hence, the division between the two filters through which socialization 
must “pass”: domestic elite, political structures and processes; and domestic mass political culture 
and participation traditions.  
 
Domestic elites, political structures and processes (filter 2) 
A norm set being promoted by international agent can be adopted and internalized through actions 
of state and societal actors and/or through including of the promoted norm set into national laws. 
With other words, as a result of the socializing actor‟s efforts, decision-makers at the state level will 
have to accept the promoted norm set and act accordingly through legislation or changed 
behaviour. It is therefore important that the socializing efforts are directed at the persons who can 
influence the decision making process or influential circles within the political elite. (Flockhart 
2005: 52).  
This raises the question of the possibility to access the relevant decision-makers at the national 
level, which depends on the characteristics of political structures of the target state and on the 
salience attached to the norm set by the political elite. The more alien the norm set is to the 
political culture, the more difficult it will be to implement it. But the easy access to decision-makers 
in the political system does not automatically mean an advantage for the promotion of the norm 
set among them, as they are in the same way easily accessible by other competing norm sets. In this 
context it is extremely important that the norm promoter knows and understands the political 
structures and processes in the target state.   
Political elite of a state is not one homogeneous mass but consists of different groups, which are 
likely to compete with each other and have difficult valuations of the norm set being promoted. 
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Members of the elite from a foreign ministry or a defence ministry, from a left-wing party or a 
right-wing party etc. can have different cultures and identification with the socializing agent and its 
norm set. Moreover, some of these elites may have importance for the transfer of the norm set to 
political elites, while other will be important for the diffusion of the norm set into the 
nation/people level. Thus, the process of the norm promotion is extremely complex and requires a 
deep understanding of the domestic elite, political structures and processes. (Flockhart 2005: 53).  
 
Domestic mass political culture and participation traditions (filter 3) 
Both the possibility to gain access to strategically important members of the mass domestic public 
and the salience of the norm set being promoted are important at the nation/people level as at the 
state/elite level. Nonetheless, the process and the requirements for successful norm diffusion at 
two levels differ. At the state/elite level access depends on the possibility to meet with the key elite 
members. At the nation/people level the key factor is interest or salience of the norm set being 
promoted - an “interested audience” is thereby needed for successful norm diffusion. Domestic 
political culture with high levels of civic participation in political process, in institutional and 
associational life, a strong and vibrant civil society is the necessary conditions for successful norm 
diffusion at the nation/people level. (Flockhart 2005: 53-54).  
Trine Flockhart (2005) argues that in contrast to elites, which may be easier to convince about the 
specific issue via persuasion or reinforcement, attitudes at the mass level are more firmly rooted in 
national culture, traditions and are less susceptible to persuasion. Consequently, socialization at the 
nation/people level is likely to be a longer process then at the state/elite level. (Flockhart 2005: 54). 
 
3.3 Political culture 
 According to Almond (1989), each political system comprises a system culture, a process culture 
and a policy culture.  
Political culture can be understood as “public attitudes toward politics and their role within the political 
system” (Almond et al. 2007:46). A nation‟s political culture includes its citizens‟ orientations toward 
three levels: the political system, the political and policymaking process, and policy outputs and 
outcomes.  
The orientations towards the system level involve the citizens‟ and leaders‟ views of the values and 
organizations that comprise the political system. This level also comprises the citizens identification 
with the nations and theirs accept of the general system of government.   
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The process level of political culture includes expectations of how politics should function, and 
individuals‟ relationship to the political process. Almond & Verba identifies three different patterns 
in the citizens‟ roles in the political process: participants, subjects and parochial (Almond & Verba 
1989). Participants are actively involve if the political process. They are informed about politics, 
make demands on the governments and grant their support to political leaders based on 
performance. Subjects are passive do not actively involve themselves in politics and passively obey 
government officials and the law. Parochials are hardly aware of government and politics, and do 
not engage in political activities. They may be people living in remote areas, or people who ignore 
politics and impact on their lives. Democracy is normally identified with a more participatory 
political culture.  
The policy level deals with citizens‟ and leaders‟ policy expectations from the government.  
 
3.4 Complex Socialization Model as analytic framework 
Socialization of a new norm set by an external socializing agent is a very complex process involving 
multiple processes and different agents.  
The Complex Socialization Model differentiates between four different out-groups of states 
depending on the specific in-group orientation at the domestic state/elite and nation/people levels. 
This differentiation is based on Frank Schimmelfennig‟s (2000) conclusions that two factors are the 
most prominent for the success of IS: at the state/elite level it is the ideology on which the 
government has based its legitimacy after the collapse of communism, and at the nation/people 
level it is the strength of western orientations in society. By combining the two factors the four 
out-groups with varying distance to the in-group can be identified (Flockhart 2005:55):   
Out-group 1: countries with a liberal government and a strong domestic Western orientation. 
Out-group 2: countries with a liberal government and a weak domestic Western orientation. 
Out-group 3: countries with a non-liberal government and a strong domestic Western orientation. 
Out-group 4: countries with a non-liberal government and a weak domestic Western orientation.      
Socialization can be top-down and bottom-up. In top-down approach the socializing agent directs 
its efforts at the state/elite level, while in bottom-up approach the socializing efforts are directed at 
the nation/people level. (Flockhart 2005:55)  
The out-groups countries with liberal democratic governments wishing to be included in the in-
group and with strong domestic Western identification are regarded as being closest to the in-
group. Countries belonging to out-group 2 and out-group 3 are at the similar distance from the in-
group, though the socialization strategies applied to each group are significantly different. In the 
case of out-group 4, the possibilities for socialization at the both domestic levels are limited, except 
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the possibility of lending support to anti-system forces, which can facilitate a change in the 
country‟s self-perception and identity. 
Thus, the Complex Socialization model is built on the assumption that the initial self- and other-
categorization process is a crucial factor for the further process of socialization (Flockhart 2005: 
56). Positioning of a state into one of the four out-groups is of a considerable importance in regard 
to which socialization strategies will be applied and which societal groups can be reached by the 
socializing agent. 
The key determinant for a successful socialization is thereby an ideational closeness between 
socializing agency and socializee both at elite/state and people/nation level (the case of out-group 
1). This is an optimal situation as socialization process is taking place as both external (from 
socializing agency towards country) and internal (from state/elite level to nation/people level). The 
conclusion is that “only socializees that fit into out-group 1 are likely to undergo successful socialization, 
understood as obtaining in-group (novice) membership” (Flockhart 2005: 58). Nevertheless, the perspective 
of successful socialization of the other out-groups is dependent on their movement from one out-
group to another (closer to the in-group) as a result of gradual domestic change induced by 
reinforcement and/or persuasion strategies, or through the occurrence of a new critical juncture  
and consequent fundamental change in the country‟s self-categorization and prevailing norm set.   
                  
3.5 Operationalization of the theory 
The theory of IS and political culture serves as a framework for analysis.  
In accordance with IS, the EU is viewed in the thesis as an agent of IS exerting soft power in order 
to elicit compliance with democratic norms by Ukraine. Ukraine is the outsider officially declaring 
its wish to become a member of the European democratic society. IS is understood as the process 
of inducing Ukraine into the constitutive democratic norms and rules of the European Union. It 
means that the EU plays the role of a socializing agent and that Ukraine is the socializee. The 
outcome of this process (dependent variable) is conditioned by a number of international and 
national variables (independent variables). These variables can both facilitate and constrain the level 
of compliance.     
International variables refer to the attributes of the EU‟s offers (or rewards), if Ukraine complies 
with the requirements.  
National variables are those conditions which are connected to the expectations of Ukrainian 
political elites and population regarding the reward. The high degree of attractiveness of the EU‟s 
benefits will play a mobilising effect on political elites and society, thus facilitating the 
implementation of the reforms. 
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If the EU requirements coincide with the national priorities regarding societal problems which has 
to be addressed at first, then the governments would be under high pressure to comply with the 
requirements as the cost of non-compliance would be high. 
Self and other categorisation expressed in the high level of identification with the norm promoter 
can facilitate compliance. Thus, the high level of European orientation/identification of Ukraine, 
would have positive influence on implementation of the reforms. If orientations/identifications are 
divided, then the process of socialisation will be more problematic.        
Characteristics of political structures and processes will hinder compliance if the costs of 
implementation of the reforms are high. It means that the government would be reluctant to carry 
out reforms, if their implementation will lead to the loss of power.  
The last national variable is the ability of the society to be an agent of change. High levels of 
political awareness and participation in political processes creates strong mechanisms for control 
with governmental actions. Vibrant civil society is an important factor in empowering and 
organising societal actions thus enabling influence on political decision-making.  
To sum up, the variables, which condition the process of IS and the level of compliance are 
presented in table 2. 
 
Table 1. Variables conditioning the process and outcome of IS 
Independent variables 
International  Benefits/rewards 
Requirements 
National  Self and other categorisation: European identification/orientation  
National political structures and processes: cost of compliance 
Society as an agent of change: participation traditions and civil society 
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4. THE EU’S APPROACH TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN 
UKRAINE 
 
This chapter presents the approach developed by the EU in order to promote democratic reforms 
in Ukraine. First, I will look at the characteristics of the EU‟s approach towards Ukraine deployed 
within the framework of the ENP and EaP (paragraph 4.1 and 4.2). Afterwards the requirements 
of the EU regarding democratic reforms, which are investigated in this thesis, will be presented 
(paragraph 4.3). The first and second research questions will thereby be answered:      
 What are the main elements and mechanisms of the EU‟s approach to promote 
democratic reforms in Ukraine? 
 What are the specific requirements of the EU in respect to democratic reforms in 
Ukraine? 
 
4.1 The European Neighbourhood Policy  
In light of the EU‟s coming enlargement with the CEC, which meant that the EU would share a 
common border with Ukraine, and following the proposal from the Swedish and British 
governments, the EU decided in April 2002 to study how to strengthen relations between the EU 
and its coming Eastern neighbours. The decision in November 2002 to launch a New Neighbours 
Initiative was accompanied by negative developments in Ukraine, such as “Kolchuga affair”, which 
revealed the involvement of Ukrainian government in sales of anti-aircraft systems to Iraq, and 
anti-Kuchma demonstrations, which had a cooling effect on the EU‟s ambitions regarding Ukraine.  
The European Commission adopted on 11 March 2003 the communication Wider Europe - 
Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, which set out a 
new framework – European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) - for relations with Russia, the Western 
NIS and the Southern Mediterranean. The Communication proposes a framework of cooperation 
for the next decade aiming at development of “a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a „ring of 
friends‟ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations” (European Commission 2003). 
The rationale behind the Communication is the EU‟s wish to find other ways than to promise 
membership in the EU in order to promote stability, security and prosperity.   
The ENP introduced a prospect of a closer economic integration with the EU, a stake in the EU‟s 
Internal Market, which should be accompanied by further integration and liberalisation to promote 
the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (the four freedoms). Differences 
between the neighbouring countries in terms of progress in political and economic reforms, and 
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their differing aspirations regarding EU membership are recognised. At the same time it is clearly 
stated, that the ENP has nothing to do with the question of membership perspective:  
“The aim of the new Neighbourhood Policy is therefore to provide a framework for the development of a new 
relationship which would not, in medium-term, include a perspective of membership or a role in the Union‟s 
institutions. A response to the practical issues posed by proximity and neighbourhood should be seen as separate from 
the question of EU accession.” (European Commission 2003)      
The ENP is modelled on the enlargement strategy and is based on principles of a differentiated, 
progressive, and benchmarked approach. The idea behind the ENP is to provide an alternative to 
enlargement, to extend the successful application of pre-accession conditionality, but without 
incurring the cost of enlargement. The overall objective of the ENP is to develop closer 
cooperation aimed at reducing poverty, creating prosperity, and intensifying political and cultural 
relations, which is dependent on the progress made by the neighbouring countries in political and 
economic reforms.  
The ENP‟s starting point is the requirement of a strong commitment to building up of 
administrative, institutional and legal capacity. The extension of proposed benefits of closer 
integration and financial assistance is conditional on meeting the agreed targets of reform. The 
progress made in implementation of the democratic reforms determines the possibility for offering 
the EU‟s benefits. Thus, the ENP is based on the conditionality approach: if no progress in 
democratic reforms is made, no offers will be proposed.     
The ENP provides for elaboration of Action Plans for neighbouring countries in order to clearly 
define the overarching strategic policy targets and benchmarks by which the reform progress can 
be judged over several years. Benchmarks are supposed to offer grater predictability and certainty 
than the traditional conditionality.  Action Plans replace the EU‟s common strategies and are 
regarded as the main policy document in respect to neighbouring countries. Implementation of the 
Action Plans is subjected to annual review of progress, which should contribute to the 
demonstration of the EU‟s political interest and provide governments with the opportunity to 
receive credit from the EU for the reform efforts.          
Where the EU and the neighbouring country have moved beyond the existing framework, 
undertaking new entitlements and obligations, the possibility of conclusion of Neighbourhood 
Agreements is envisaged. Neighbourhood Agreements would supplement and build on existing 
contractual arrangements, i.e. the PCA in case of Ukraine. 
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Furthermore, the ENP proposed a new Neighbourhood Instrument for economic assistance, as 
well as extending the EIB lending to Ukraine and other CIS countries9.    
 
4.2 Eastern Partnership 2009 
The EaP offers deeper bilateral engagement by providing foundations for conclusion of association 
agreements including free trade agreements for those countries, which have made sufficient 
progress towards the values and principles of democracy and market economy. Institution-Building 
programmes funded by the EU are offered to improve countries administrative capacity through 
training, technical assistance and any other appropriate measures. The EaP provides for the 
conclusion of visa liberalisation and readmission agreements in order to promote the mobility of 
citizens. This implies a conclusion of “mobility and security pacts”, allowing for easier legitimate 
travel to the EU while at the same time stepping up efforts to combat corruption, organized crime 
and illegal migration. The ultimate long term goal would be visa-free travel provided that 
conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place. (Prague Eastern Partnership Summit 
2009)  
 
4.3 EU-Ukraine Action Plan 
The EU presented its “Wider Europe-Neighbourhood” initiative towards Ukraine on the EU-
Ukraine summit in Yalta on 7 October 2003, stressing the broad range of new opportunities and 
facilitation of Ukraine‟s progressive participation in the EU‟s internal marked and in EU policies 
and programmes. At the summit it was agreed to launch consultations on the elaboration of an 
Action Plan for Ukraine.  
The December 2003 Cooperation Committee, in Kyiv, reviewed the progress in the 
implementation of the PCA. At the Cooperation Council, which took place on 18 May 2004 in 
Brussels and was the first Council between the enlarged EU and Ukraine, the effects of the 
enlargement were discussed. The both sides stressed the importance of the ENP for strengthening 
of EU-Ukraine relations. 
The importance of the values of democracy and rule of law were reiterated at the 8 July 2004 
Summit in The Hague. 2005 saw further intensification of the cooperation between the EU and 
Ukraine. A joint EU-Ukraine Action Plan was endorsed by the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council on 
21 February 2005 for a timeframe of three years. 
                                               
9 EIB lending was first extended to Russia within the framework of the Northern Dimension initiative.  
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The AP is based on values of democracy and is supposed to bring the cooperation between the EU 
and Ukraine to a more close relationship. The AP is designed to help fulfil the provisions of the 
PCA, to support Ukraine‟s further integration into European economic and social structures, and 
to advance the approximation of the Ukrainian legislation, norms and standards to those of the 
EU. The AP acknowledges Ukraine‟s European aspirations and welcomes Ukraine‟s European 
choice without offering any membership perspective. (EU-Ukraine Action Plan 2005). 
The AP defined a number of directions for action, both within and beyond the scope of the PCA. 
Though, a particular priority has been given to actions in regard to democratic reforms, more 
precisely to further strengthening of the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule 
of law.      
This priority direction identifies following actions: 
 Ensure democratic conduct of presidential (2004) and parliamentary (2006) elections, in 
accordance with OSCE standards and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, including on the 
media; 
 Ensure that any further legislative reforms be conducted in line with international 
standards; 
 Continue administrative reform and strengthening of local self-government, through 
appropriate legislation, in line with those standards, contained in the European Charter on 
Local Self Government. (EU-Ukraine Action Plan, 2005). 
Another direction for action, which is essential for strengthening democratic institutions, is to 
ensure the effectiveness of the fight against corruption. The AP specifies in this connection that Ukraine has 
to join the Council of Europe Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) and implement 
relevant recommendations, including a revision of the Ukrainian national strategy for the fight 
against corruption and promotion of transparency and accountability of the public administration 
(EU-Ukraine Action Plan 2005).   
Within the framework of the AP the EU offered new cooperation perspectives. The AP proposed 
the perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a deeper integration, including through a stake in 
the EU‟s internal market. The implementation of the AP would create grounds for upgrading of 
the scope and intensity of political cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. The AP opens up for 
the possibility for Ukraine to participate in key aspects of EU policies and programmes, promoting 
cultural, educational, environmental, technical and scientific links. The establishment of a free trade 
area (FTA) between Ukraine and the EU was envisaged following Ukraine‟s accession to the WTO.  
For the implementation of the AP the EU offered increased financial support through the new 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument (ENPI) as well as support from European 
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Investment Bank for projects involving infrastructure investment. In order to further legislative 
approximation to the EU norms and standards, the AP envisaged support in form of technical 
assistance, twinning, targeted advice and support through a mechanism such as TAIEX. (EU-
Ukraine Action Plan 2005) 
The pace of fulfilment of the AP is decisive in respect to the possibility and contents of a new 
Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU.    
As it was decided at the annual EU-Ukraine summit in September 2008, the new instrument   to 
replace the AP was agreed upon in June 2009 and entered into force on 24 November 2009. This 
instrument, the Association Agenda (AsA) is designed to prepare and facilitate the entry into force 
of the new Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine.  
Even though the document has changed the name and is regarded as being more ambitious, the 
AsA does not bring radically new things in comparison with the AP. It reiterates the goal of 
achieving a deeper political and economic integration leading to establishment of a free trade area, 
the importance of dialog on visa issues with the long-term perspective of establishing a visa-free 
regime. It further underlines the need for consolidation of democratic reforms in Ukraine and 
defines strengthening of the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law as a 
first priority for action. (EU-Ukraine Association Agenda 2009)  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
With the adoption of the ENP in 2003 and the AP which is now replaced by the AsA, the EU 
introduced a clear conditionality approach to the promotion of democratic transformations in 
Ukraine. The pace and concrete progress in implementation of the democratic reforms is decisive 
for the possibility of closer integration with the EU. The mechanism of conditionality designed by 
the EU has been composed of the AP and the annual reviews of its implementation. The AP 
defines the requirements regarding democratic reforms in Ukraine and those benefits that will be 
granted to Ukraine provided the requirements are fulfilled.     
The AP ascribes a particular priority to actions directed at further strengthening of the stability and 
effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, and at ensuring the 
effectiveness of the fight against corruption.  
Despite the broad and not very precise formulations, following priority directions for the 
strengthening of the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law  can be 
identified on the basis of the AP and the AsA:  
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 ensure democratic conduct of presidential and parliamentary elections in accordance with 
international standards and the recommendations made by OSCE/ODIHR, including on 
the free media;     
 promote constitutional reform in order to create a system of effective checks and balances 
between state institutions, taking into account the relevant recommendations of the Venice 
Commission; 
 carry out administrative reform with a view to enhance the capacity of the public 
administration system in Ukraine; 
 strengthen the functioning of local and regional self-government, in line with the relevant 
standards contained in the European Charter on Local Self-Government; 
 ensure the effectiveness of the fight against corruption.  
 
If Ukraine is successful in implementing the above mentioned democratic reforms, it can expect to 
be granted following benefits from the EU:  
 An upgrade in the scope and intensity of political cooperation;  
 Progressive participation in the EU‟s internal market and the continued reduction of trade 
barriers which will stimulate investment and growth; 
 Further economic integration, including the establishment of a FTA; 
 Possibility for Ukraine to participate progressively in the EU policies and programmes 
promoting cultural, educational, environmental, technical and scientific links; 
 Visa facilitation agreement and in long-term perspective visa-free regime.   
In order to support reforms, the EU envisages increased financial support through the ENPI and 
the European Investment Bank, as well as support in form of technical assistance, twinning10 and 
targeted advice and support through a mechanism such as TAIEX11. I regard these not as benefits 
which can incite the will to carry out the reforms, but as a practical tool for the achievement of the 
                                               
10 The Twinning programme was launched in 1998 and constitutes one of the principal tools of the EU‟s institution 
building assistance. Twinning aims to help beneficiary countries in the development of modern and efficient 
administrations, with the structures, human resources and management skills needed to implement the acquis 
communautaire to the same standards as EU member states. Twinning is implemented in the form of long-term 
secondment of EU experts to the beneficiary state. The experts are seconded from an EU member state administration 
or from another approved body in a member state to work full time for a minimum of 12 months in the corresponding 
ministry in partner country to implement the reform project. (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-
work/technical-assistance/twinning_en.htm)  
11 TAIEX is the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument managed by the European Commission. 
TAIEX supports EU partner countries with regard to the approximation, application and enforcement of EU 
legislation. It is largely demand driven and facilitates the delivery of appropriate tailor-made expertise to address issues 
at short notice. TAIEX assistance takes form of expert and study visits, and assessment missions. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/taiex/what-is-taiex/index_en.htm) 
 34 
defined goals. Therefore the issue of financial and technical assistance is not included in the 
analysis in chapter 6.    
 
Having presented the main features of the EU‟s approach and the specific requirements of the EU 
in respect to democratic reforms in Ukraine, I will proceed with the analysis of the progress made 
by Ukraine since the adoption of the AP in 2005 in its compliance with the EU‟s requirements in 
the field of strengthening of the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law .     
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5. PROGRESS IN DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN UKRAINE 2005-2009 
This chapter is devoted to answering the third research question:  
 Has there been any progress in implementation of the required democratic 
reforms in Ukraine since the adoption of the EU-Ukraine Action in 2005?  
In the following the progress in implementation of the reforms needed to strengthen the stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law since the adoption of the AP in 2005 
will be reviewed. As it has been identified in the previous chapter, I will look at the conduct of 
elections (paragraph 5.1), freedom of the media (paragraph 5.2), the pace of constitutional reform 
(paragraph 5.3), the situation with the administrative reform and reform of the local and regional 
self-government (paragraph 5.4), and the efforts to combat corruption (paragraph 5.5). In 
paragraph 5.6 the main achievements and lack of progress will be summarised.       
 
5.1 Ensuring democratic conduct of the elections 
As it has been described earlier, one of the requirements identified in the AP was the conduct of 
parliamentary elections in accordance with OSCE standards and OSCE/ODIHR 
recommendations. 
The 26 March 2006 parliamentary elections were observed by an International Observer Mission 
under the leadership of the OSCE/ODIHR, which included observers from the European 
Parliament. The Mission concluded that the parliamentary elections were “largely” in line with 
international standards for democratic elections. Fundamental civil and political rights, such as 
freedom of expression and assembly, were respected. The vibrant media environment provided for 
possibilities to free expression and intensive discussions between the candidates, thereby enabling 
voters to make informed choices. 
Before the elections, the legislative framework has been revised in accordance with the 
recommendations made by the OSCE following the 2004 presidential elections and the Law on the 
Election of People‟s Deputies were adopted in July 2005.  
Though, some shortcomings due to technical flaws were noted by the Observer Mission, such as 
delayed setting-up of a number of polling stations, a number exceeding the legal maximum of 
registered voters at certain polling stations and drawbacks in the legal requirements regarding 
campaign financing, as well as absence of a centralised voter registration system, which created 
possibilities for multiple entries (which means multiple voting of the same person). The observers 
underlined that the voter lists should be overhauled and updated. It was also noted that Ukraine 
had come a long way, but the Ukrainian authorities should be aware of the need not to lose the 
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positive momentum and prevent cases of deliberate fraud, such as one observed in the city of 
Kirovograd, where local militia directed the vote count. To avoid these weaknesses it was 
recommended that electoral legislation should be revised and a central, electronic voters‟ register 
should be created. (European Commission 2006; OSCE/ODIHR 2006) 
In spring 2007 a political crisis broke out between the President and the ruling coalition. The crisis 
was caused by the lack of clarity in the Constitutional powers of the President and the Cabinet of 
Ministers, and aggravated by dysfunctional system of checks and balances. The crisis ended with 
the agreement between the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament to hold 
pre-term parliamentary elections on 30 September 2007. I will return to these developments later in 
the analysis of political structures and processes (paragraph 6.3).  
The International Observer Mission under the leadership of the OSCE/ODIHR concluded that 
“the elections were conducted mostly in line with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and other 
international standards for democratic elections” (OSCE/ODIHR 2007). The Mission noted that the 
elections took place in an open and competitive environment with a wide choice among 20 political 
parties and electoral blocs, which were registered in a generally inclusive and transparent process.  
However, the international observers also found some areas of concern, including some 
amendments to the election law, the inadequate quality of voter lists, possible disenfranchisement 
of voters, and the lack of possibilities for absentee voting. 
The recommendation to adopt the unified election code and to establish a centralized Voter 
Register system in due time for the next nationwide electoral process were reiterated by the 
OSCE/ODIHR. It should be noted, that the Ukrainian Parliament passed a law on the State 
Voters‟ Register that provided for the establishment of a centralised computerised nation-wide 
register. But the law entered into force in October 2007, which was too late to play any role in the 
elections. (European Commission 2008)  
In the period before the upcoming presidential elections on 17 January 2010 Ukraine has not 
implemented the recommendations made by the OSCE/ODIHR on the drafting of the Election 
Code. The work with the setting up of a centralised electronic voters‟ register is progressing and 
the first stage of the establishment of a permanent State Voter Register was completed in 
September 2009.   
The establishment of the centralised register raises expectations for an improved election process. 
At the same time, an amendment to electoral law, which allows voters to apply for inclusion on 
voter lists in polling stations on election day, creates grounds for an increased potential for 
irregularities. 
 37 
New amendments to the legal framework for the presidential election were passed on the initiative 
of the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYT) and with the support of the Party of Regions (PoR). The 
president vetoed the amendments. The parliament subsequently overturned the veto. Two appeals 
have been lodged before the Constitutional Court, which question the constitutionality of certain 
new provisions in the election legislation.  
Many amendments to the election legislation can be regarded as a step backwards, as some 
provisions contradict with international standards and good practice. For example, the 
amendments contain new provisions that limit the right to lodge complaints and to challenge 
election results. Furthermore, the new amendments do not provide a framework for domestic non-
party observers, which are important in order to secure transparency, accountability and confidence 
at all stages of an election process12. (OSCE/ODIHR 2009)  
Thus, Ukraine generally has complied with the requirement to ensure democratic conduct of 
elections in accordance with international standards. Both the March 2006 parliamentary elections 
and the pre-term September 2007 parliamentary elections have been recognised as democratic. 
Nevertheless some problems remain in respect to ensure the proper legislative basis for the 
conduct of the elections, to remove technical shortcomings such as centralised voter register, and 
ensure the fair count of casted votes. 
 
5.2 Freedom of the media 
If compared with the situation under Kuchma, the Orange Revolution brought striking changes as 
regards freedom of the media and expression. One of the important steps was the abolition of the 
practice of issuing temniki as a form of informal state censorship of the media. The practice of 
issuing temniki (from Russian “temy” – themes) started around 2001. They were prepared by the 
Presidential Administration and distributed to top managers and editors of television stations with 
the aim to influence the coverage of the news. Temniki defined which topics were “important” and 
had to be covered, and which topics should not be mentioned at all. If the media did not comply 
with the instructions of the temniki, then they could risk a wide range of sanctions, such as tax 
audits, license cancellation, arbitrary libel suits, demotions, and pay cuts. (Human Rights Watch 
2003) Abolition of the practise by the new Ukrainian government created a completely different 
media environment, which allowed for the more free debate and expression of different opinions.    
Ukraine has never established a system of public service broadcasting. Even though a law “About 
the system of public service broadcasting” was adopted in 1997, it has never been implemented. 
                                               
12 The importance of domestic non-party election observation has been stressed by the OSCE/ODIHR in accordance 
with paragraph 8 of the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document. 
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Ukraine‟s media field consists of a number state-owned and private-owned media. This creates the 
possibility for manipulation and distortion of the information at any time. A number of draft laws 
establishing public service broadcasting have been proposed. In January 2006, the Parliament 
adopted the Law on television and radio broadcast. But not much progress has been made since 
then. (European Commission 2006)  
In 2007 the EU assessed that Ukrainian electronic and printed media were characterised by wide-
ranging pluralism. Nevertheless, the issues of establishment of the public service broadcasting and 
ensuring pluralism in the regional and local media pluralism in the regional and local level remained 
to be addressed. (European Commission 2008) Media at local and regional levels has largely 
remained under the influence of regional and local administrations, which often own them. This 
creates vast possibilities for influence of certain political and economic interests. (OSCE/ODIHR 
2009)   
In 2008 some cases of threats to journalists critical of officials, businessmen or prominent figures 
occurred. An increase in the incidents of paid for „news‟ articles and reports in the press took place. 
In March 2009 a revised draft law on establishment of public service broadcasting  was submitted 
to the parliament by BYuT, but the parliament did not endorsed the draft and sent it to further 
consideration in expert committee.  
In the context, when the media is owned by the state or private entities, the opportunities to 
execute pressure on journalists are wide. (European Commission 2009) In 2009, nine years since 
the opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze was found killed13, the responsible for ordering the 
killing of the journalist are not brought to trial yet14. Some rumours say that besides Kuchma, the 
current parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn has been involved in preparation of the 
assassination.  
The situation with the freedom of media and expression in Ukraine has markedly improved after 
the Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, even if there is no direct interference in private media on the 
part of the state, in the absence of the public broadcasting services, there are multiple possibilities 
for certain political and economic groups to influence media. The instances of payments for 
„ordered‟ coverage occur and can be expected to aggravate in the 2010 president election campaign.         
 
                                               
13 Georgiy Gongadze, Ukrainian journalist critical of the Kuchma government, disappeared on 16 September 2000. His 
beheaded body was found on 2 November 2000 in the forest near town Tarasha ca. 100 km south from Kyiv. 
14 In March 2008, three former high-ranking officers of the Ukraine‟s Ministry of Interior were brought to trial and 
were found guilty in the killing of Gongadze. One was imprisoned for 13 years, and two others were imprisoned for 12 
years. The chief of the Ministry‟s department, Oleksij Pukach, was arrested in July 2009 (Unian 
http://www.unian.net/ukr/news/news-241259.html; http://www.unian.net/ukr/news/news-327435.html) 
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5.3 Constitutional reform15 
The Constitution of Ukraine, adopted in June 1996, was amended in December 200416. The 
constitutional amendments modified the role of main political institutions – the president, the 
parliament and the government. According to the amendments the nature of the political system of 
Ukraine has deeply changed – from a presidential-parliamentary regime into parliamentary-
presidential one.    
The constitutional amendments were agreed as a part of political compromise between the 
incumbent authorities and the opposition coalition. The amendments were adopted in the context 
of unprecedented public protest of the Orange Revolution, in a hurried way, with the aim to solve 
the political crisis. Both the context and the process of adoption of the constitutional amendments 
have influenced the future political development in a negative way. The legitimacy of the process of 
constitutional reform has been questioned. And the imperfections in constitutional provisions have 
led to continued political instability and tug-of-war. 
The Constitution is imprecise in definition of the roles and responsibilities of the President, the 
Cabinet of Ministers and the Parliament. Furthermore, the Constitution contains provisions that 
are not in line with European standards.  
According to the Constitution, the prime minister nominates the members of the government and 
the parliament, Verkhovna Rada, approves the composition of the government. But the two key 
ministers - Minister for Defence and Minister for Foreign Affairs, are nominated by the president. 
The Verkhovna Rada can terminate the authority of the ministers17. The president has also the 
power to initiate the procedure of no confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers18. This nomination 
procedure and the possibilities to terminate the Cabinet of Ministers undermine the necessary 
cohesion of the government and its ability to effectively exercise its policy.  
The roles and responsibilities of the president and the government are unclearly defined in the 
Constitution. The President has the responsibility to ensure state independence and national 
security and to carry out foreign political activity of the state19. To compare, the government has 
the obligation to ensure the state sovereignty, to take measures to defend national security, and to 
                                               
15 This chapter does not aim to give a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional design most suitable for Ukraine, 
but will show the problematic elements of Ukrainian constitution as regards European standards in this field.  Detailed 
analyses of the history and provisions of Ukrainian constitution can be found, for example, in (Wolczuk 2001) 
16 By Law 2222-IV. 
17 Cf. article 85 § 1 (12) of the Constitution.  
18 Cf. article 87 § 1 of the Consitution.  
19 Cf. article 106 § 1 and § 3 of the Consitution. 
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implement domestic and foreign policy of the state20. The responsibilities and competencies of the 
president and the government are overlapping, which present the constant source of conflict 
between the two constitutional bodies. 
The role of the president is manifested in the provisions regarding responsibility of the 
government. Even though the government is approved by the parliament, it is responsible not only 
to the Verkhovna Rada but also to the president. The legislative powers of the state bodies are 
further confused by the power of the president to issue decrees and directives that are mandatory 
for the execution.  
The other controversial provisions of the Constitution, which are not in line with the European 
standards, are the provisions regulating procedure for the appointment and the role of the General 
Prosecutor.  The president, with the consent of the parliament, appoints the General Prosecutor, 
who has the responsibility for “supervision of the observance of human and citizens‟ rights and freedoms and the 
fulfilment of laws by bodies of executive power and by bodies of local self-government”21.  
These provisions infringe the principle of separation of powers, as the Prosecutor‟s powers 
entwine with powers of legislative, executive and judicial branches. The relationship between the 
Prosecutor and the executive branch are thus vague and entangled. This makes the institution of 
the prosecutor conducive to the political influences, which endangers the effective supervision of 
the adherence to the rule of law.  
Furthermore, the Prosecutor has the powers which would be more appropriately executed by the 
judicial branch. The competences of the Prosecutor to supervise observance of the human rights 
and freedoms overlap with the role of the Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights 
(Ombudsman), which weakens the institution of ombudsman. Such extensive powers of the 
Prosecutor have been assessed as going “against European standards in this field”. (Venice Commission 
2005)  
The Venice Commission concluded in its opinion on 2004 constitutional amendment that “a 
number of provisions, such as the rights of legislative initiative conferred on both the Cabinet and the President, or the 
President‟s role in foreign and defence policy might lead to unnecessary political conflicts and thus undermine the 
necessary strengthening of the rule of law in the country. In general, the constitutional amendments, as adopted, do not 
yet fully allow the aim of the constitutional reform of establishing a balanced and functional system of government to 
be attained.” (Venice Commission 2005)  
                                               
20 Cf. article 116 § 1, § 7 of the Constitution.    
21Article 121 of the Constitution of Ukraine of 28 June 1996 amended by Law no 2222-IV of 8 December 2004, 
available (in Ukrainian) at http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=254%EA%2F96-
%E2%F0&p=1258495387274828   
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In order to bring the Constitution of Ukraine in compliance with the European principle of 
pluralist democracy and the rule of law, following changes need to be done:  
 The provisions about the imperative mandate has to be removed, as they infringe the free 
and independent mandate of the parliamentarians to follow their convictions and at the 
same time remain a member of the Parliament; 
 The roles and competences between the president, the parliament and the government 
need to be clarified so that the possibility for the president to undermine the government is 
removed; 
 The role and competences of the prosecutor general should be revised.  
The 2004 constitutional amendments entered into force in January 2006. As the following 
developments confirmed, the potential weaknesses of the Constitution turned out into a real 
problem. On 26 March 2006, Ukraine hold parliamentary elections and after a long, hard process 
of negotiation that took five months, a parliamentary majority coalition was formed in July and 
new government headed by Viktor Yanukovych took office in August 2006. I will return to these 
developments in the analysis of the political processes (paragraph 6.3).  
As it has been mentioned above, the unclear definition of roles and competencies of constitutional 
bodies resulted in the political deadlock in spring 2007 leading to pre-term parliamentary elections 
in September 2007.     
The adoption by the parliament of the law on Cabinet of Ministers in January 2007 further 
aggravated the political situation in Ukraine. The law actually changed the Ukrainian political 
system into a parliamentary republic. Such a move was considered as unconstitutional, and the 
president vetoed the law and challenged its validity in the Constitutional Court. But the parliament 
overrode the president‟s veto and adopted the law without taking into account any of amendments 
proposed by the president.  
Meanwhile, the chairman of the parliament aggravated the constitutional crisis by ordering the 
official publication of the controversial law in Holos Ukrayiny, the official journal of the parliament. 
The law was published and came into force on 2 February 2007. (OECD 2007)  
Thus, with the adoption of this law, the Ukrainian parliament disregarded the constitution and, in 
fact illegally, introduced changes that amount to constitutional amendments by an ordinary law. 
The 2007 political crisis has clearly showed that the constitution lacks an efficient system of checks 
and balances leading to the competition of the two centres of power within the executive branch – 
the president and the prime minister.    
In December 2007, the president created the National Constitutional Council with the aim to 
prepare the revision of the constitution. The council was composed of members of the presidential 
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administration, members of the different factions in the parliament, judges, representatives of the 
civil society and independent legal experts. The creation of the council and its work have been 
criticised in regard to the inclusiveness and transparency of the process. (European Commission 
2008)  
With the view of strengthening the president‟s powers, a new draft law on the Cabinet of Ministers 
was submitted by the president in January 2008, and was adopted in May 2008. 
Though, little progress has been made in reform of the Ukrainian constitution during 2008. The 
National Constitutional Council met only once, and afterwards the Party of Regions (PoR) and the 
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) withdrew from the council and formulated their own proposals 
for constitutional reform. (European Commission 2009)  
After a period of limited activity in the second half of 2008, on 31 March 2009 the president 
presented to the parliament his draft proposal to constitutional changes prepared by the National 
Constitutional Council. The president‟s draft proposal preserves to a large extent the mixed 
presidential-parliamentary system and current balance of powers. The draft proposal introduces a 
bi-cameral parliament and the right of popular initiative to introduce into the parliament new draft 
laws or amendments to the Constitution. The draft proposal formulates new rules in respect of the 
prosecution, which are in line with European standards. Furthermore, the draft proposal abandons 
the provisions of the current Constitution on the formalised majority coalition in the parliament, 
on the imperative mandate and on the double responsibility of the Cabinet of Ministers to the 
president and to the parliament. (Venice Commission 2009)        
A draft constitution prepared by BYuT and PoR has not yet been introduced in the parliament. 
Besides, a group of scholars headed by the professor Shapoval prepared an alternative draft 
constitution that has contributed to the discussions in the National Constitutional Council. 
(Council of Europe 2009)   
Since the adoption of the 2004 constitutional amendments no progress has been made in regard to 
remedy the shortcomings of the constitution. The 2004 amendments to the Constitution increased 
the parliamentary features of the Ukrainian political system. But due to a number of shortcomings 
the amended Constitution does not provide a framework for the smooth functioning of the state 
and a platform for effective decision making, impeding the implementation of sustainable reform 
policies.  Different political forces have different approaches to the issue. The issue of the 
constitutional reform is set on standby, as the political elites await the outcome of January 2010 
presidential election.         
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5.4 Administrative reform and strengthening local self-government 
“- So, I have to go back to my thesis. Today I am going to write about 
administrative and local self-government reform in Ukraine. 
-   Does it exist? ...”  
(From conversation with my Ukrainian friend) 
 
In accordance with the AP, Ukraine has to reform the system of public administration and to 
strengthen local self-government in line with the standards, contained in the European Charter on 
Local Self Government.  
Ukraine ratified the European Charter of Local Self-Government in 1997 and it entered into force 
in January 1998. By ratifying the Charter Ukraine committed itself to respect the principles of the 
Charter, which means to guarantee the political, administrative and financial independence of local 
authorities. The charter provides that local self-governments should be recognised, where relevant, 
in the constitution and in domestic legislation. Local authorities should be elected by universal 
suffrage and the competences of the local self-governance bodies should be allocated in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity22.     
 
5.4.1 Administrative reform 
It is widely recognized that the existing system of public administration in Ukraine is ineffective 
and bureaucratic. Ukrainian administrative system builds on previously-existing soviet structures 
and approaches, which are characterised by onerous decision-making, excessive bureaucracy and in 
some cases a lack of clarity about the division of responsibilities between government agencies. 
The governance in Ukraine continues to operate in accordance with inherited modes of 
organisation, practice and thinking, which derive from the former communist system practices, 
which were modified under the Kravchuk and Kuchma regimes.  
The reform of the administrative system is necessary as a prerequisite for speeding up of the 
implementation of other reforms, especially in the economic sector. Removing red-tape and 
corruption within the public authorities has the potential to improve the image of Ukraine, to make 
the country more attractive for the investors and thus contribute to the economic development and 
growth. (European Commission 2006)  
                                               
22 Full text of the European Charter of Local-Self Government is available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/122.htm. 
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The need to reform administrative system in Ukraine has been recognised by the Ukrainian 
leadership, which resulted in several, yet unsuccessful, waves of reform. These are the Kuchma‟s 
attempts to carry out the administrative reform in 1998-2000 and to revise the law on the local self-
governance in 2001-2003, and the recent process of the administrative-territorial reform since 
Yushchenko came to power in 2004. 
The progress in reforming the public administration has been slow and the institutional set up of 
the state contributes to low levels of accountability. Various initiatives to rationalise the 
institutional set up have not brought any considerable improvements. In the beginning of 2006 
there were 21 Central Bodies of Executive Power with Special Status and 3 State Committees 
reporting to the Government as a whole. There were 19 Ministers and 11 agencies and State 
Committees reporting to Ministers individually. The Cabinet of Ministers and several of the Central 
Bodies of Executive Power with Special Status had reporting relations to the President. Such an 
intricate and unclear governance structure confuses accountability chains and leads ineffectiveness 
of decision making.     
In November 2009, the Ukrainian executive institutions, besides 20 ministries, included 29 central 
bodies of executive power with special status and 13 state committees23. Thus, in four years the 
number of institutions further increased, retaining the unclear accountability system. 
The framework for policy making is not coherent and the volume of regulations is excessive. For 
example, the President issues each year about 1500 decrees, and over 2500 instructions, most of 
which are issued to the Cabinet of Ministers and require actions by ministers. The CMU issues 
about 1000 decrees and about 250 executive orders are registered each day (equals to over 60,000 
per year). Many of the documents are policy related, but many of them are related to specific 
implementation on a case-by-case basis. (OECD 2006: 80)  
Such an overload of regulations creates an enormous burden on the decision making and costs a 
lot of the time for ministries and the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (SCMU), 
because all the regulations need to be drafted, signed, implemented, reported and monitored. To 
make it even more complicated, instructions from the president go to the ministers, then to the 
SCMU and to other institutions through at system of executive orders, which also have to be 
drafted, signed, and monitored. The system of policy making is thereby highly centralised in the 
SCMU. Strategic and management frameworks for policy making are weak within the ministries, 
which tend to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. 
                                               
23 Information from the web-portal of Ukrainian government  
http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=167459&cat_id=31424, accessed on 15 November 2009 
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Such a situation provides grounds for a culture of fulfilling orders and instructions, avoiding 
initiative and responsibility. Such a culture is inimical to the emergence effective administration 
based on clear attribution of functions and responsibilities. The command character of the public 
administration is one of the most detrimental legacies from the former soviet system of 
governance, which still penetrates the mentality of both political and administrative levels. Thus, 
centralisation of policy-making, persistent command system and case-by-case decision making have 
negative effects on development of policy capacities and policy thinking in ministries. (OECD 
2006: 11)  
The inherent problems of the Ukrainian public administration seem to be recognised at political 
levels. The draft law on the civil service in executive bodies, aimed at promoting the transparency 
and accountability of the administration, were elaborated and adopted in September 2006. A year 
later, the president signed a “Decree on Measures to Reform the Civil Service of Ukraine and 
Ensure Protection of Constitutional Rights of Civil Service”. The decree instructs the government, 
inter alia, to amend the Law on Civil Service adopted in 1993 and numerously amended since, in 
order to separate political and administrative posts, establish an independent state body to manage 
the civil service, improve the recruitment, remunerations, promotion and training of civil servants. 
A chapter in the governmental programme adopted in January 2008 is devoted to the reform of the 
public administration with a view to bring it in line with European standards. (GRECO 2009)  
In March 2008 the Cabinet of Ministers created a working group for the elaboration of a draft 
Concept on the Public Administration Reform and since several discussion round tables have been 
held. In June 2008, the Centre for Adaptation of the Civil Service to the Standards of the European 
Union were created, the main function of which is to provide expertise in drafting of new 
legislation, to participate in the process of cooperation between Ukraine and international bodies 
which aim to support the public administration in Ukraine. In December 2008 the government 
presented its draft concept of reform of public administration in Ukraine, which was prepared by 
the working group created within the Ministry of Economy. The draft law on civil service has been 
prepared and it was planned to be adopted during 2009, but this has not happened yet24.  
Despite some reform efforts to reform the system of public administration, it “does not yet function as 
a system with a distinct constitutional status entrusted with providing continuity of the state, protecting legality, and 
with recognised role in policy formulation and implementation” (OECD 2006: 10). 
  
                                               
24 The draft law is available at the homepage of the Main Department of Civil Service of Ukraine 
http://www.guds.gov.ua 
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5.4.2 Local and regional self-government  
Ukraine was the first among the former soviet republics to introduce the notion of self-
government. The law on the local self-government was adopted in 1990 and had to conform to the 
soviet constitution of 1978. Thus, two rather incompatible concepts ware adopted – “local self-
governments” were classified as “state bodies”.  
The 1996 Constitution confirmed the establishment of local self-governance and defined the 
powers of its bodies. The new law on “Local Governments in Ukraine” was adopted in 1997 and 
since then has been amended numerous times. Nevertheless, the law “On Local State 
Administration” adopted in 1999 contradicts the fundamental principles of self-governance as the 
real administrative and finance power is given to the local state administrations, which are 
appointed by the president.      
The law on local governments defined the division of powers into exclusive (self-governing) and 
delegated (belonging to state power). The law established certain aspects of local self-government 
principles, such as the material and financial bases, revenues from local budgets, off-budget target 
funds. It also stipulated that local budgets are independent and shall not be a part of the state 
budget.  
Nevertheless, the law is imprecise in regard to local governments‟ budget powers, the management 
of the municipal economy, property and staff. There is no clear separation between central 
government‟s and local governments‟ responsibilities with regard to expenditures for public 
services.    
Furthermore, the state interferes in the formation of revenues and expenditures of local 
governments. The parliament passes, from time to another, laws on benefits for those groups of 
citizens, who are not entitled to receive financial support from the national budget. These expenses 
should be covered from the local budgets even though they have no provisions for this.  (OECD 
2006: 49-50)       
Ukraine has maintained the overcentralisation of state administration inherited from the soviet 
times, and lacks a clear-cut division of powers between the central state and regional and local 
governments. The excessive centralisation has been caused by the fear of the central government to 
lose control over the regional executives, which has led to disfranchisement and dysfunctioning of 
the regional governments. Disputed between appointed regional executives and elected regional 
councils resulted in poor regional governance.    
On the other hand, because of financial centralisation, the powers of regional and local authorities 
are not matched by resources, which mean that they do not have sufficient capacity to fulfil their 
tasks. As it was in soviet times, all taxes go to the central treasury and the Ministry of Finance 
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determines the budgets of the regional authorities. The allocations determined by the central 
government are often haphazard. At the same time, taxes collected by the regional authorities 
represent only a small fraction of their financial resources as the local tax rates and fees determined 
by the centre are overly low. 
In order to cover their own needs, the regional governments resort to possibility to invent taxes. 
Such taxes can take the form of different fees or penalties (sometimes illegal), extracted from 
arduous inspections directed at profitable enterprises or public institutions.  
For example, the Kyiv local administration introduced in the beginning of 2009 the so called 
“voluntary contributions” to be paid by patients for medical services, which were free of charge 
previously. This novelty was introduced with the aim raise the quality of medical services and to 
increase the salaries of the medical workers, which are purely financed from the local budgets. In 
practice these voluntary contributions are obligatory for the patients, because they risk not to 
receive the necessary treatment if they refuse to make a voluntary contribution.  
Moreover, the municipal authorities defined the size of the monthly “voluntary” contribution 
(depending on institutions specialization) that should be delivered by medical institutions to a 
special bank account. Consequently, the amount to be delivered by each medical worker was 
defined. If medical worker fails to collect the amount from the patients, he has to pay from his 
own salary. A medical institution that is not capable of delivering the requited amount becomes an 
object of diverse inspections and controls. The results of such inspections can lead to 
reorganizations and dismissals. Thus, medical workers are forced to collect these voluntary 
contributions in order to fulfil the fixed quota. Otherwise they will lose their job.     
Such a practice contradicts article 49 of Ukraine‟s constitution, which stipulates that medical 
services in public medical institutions are free of charge. Nevertheless, the practice continues and 
no claim has been lodged to the law enforcement bodies.   
During 2005-2009 the concepts “On Local Self-Government Reform” and “On Administrative-
Territorial System Reform” were developed by the government. Discussions on the “Concept of 
Territorial and Administrative Reform” have been organised by the National Association of 
Regional Development Agencies in cooperation with Ministry of Regional Development. A 
number of draft laws have been elaborated to address the problems of local self-government. Thus, 
the process of discussions and debates are taking place but the practical changes have not been 
implemented yet.  
Thus, more than 10 years since Ukraine acceded to the European Charter on Local Self 
Government, the system of local self-government in Ukraine is still not in line with the 
fundamental principles of the charter. The principles of democracy and decentralisation of public 
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powers and responsibilities on the basis of subsidiarity are far from being fully implemented. The 
conclusions of the report prepared by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in 2001 that 
“the existing laws and Constitution concerning local and regional self-government are weak, often unclear and badly 
implemented” (Council of Europe 2001) are still relevant.  
                                     
5.5 Fight against corruption  
” - Have you ever happened to bribe someone or be bribed? 
- ... My principle is neither give nor receive a bribe, but… Once my husband 
called me late at night after returning from a party, and asked with a totally 
drunk voice: ”I‟ve been taken by the police. What should I do?” And I said: 
”Give them 100 dollar.” And by paying 150 dollar he was escorted home in a 
police car with a flash.” 
(Inna Bogoslovska, MP, lawyer, presidential candidate, answering 
the question during a television talk-show “Shuster Live” on 4 
December 2009.)   
 
Fight against corruption has been defined in the AP as necessary prerequisite for strengthening of 
democracy. Corruption undermines implementation of democratic reforms as it corrodes the trust 
of the people in the institutions of democracy. The need for Ukraine to join the Council of Europe 
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) has been identified by the AP as one of the priority 
actions. Furthermore, Ukraine has been required to revise its national strategy for the fight against 
corruption, and promote transparency and accountability of the public administration.   
The need to fight corruption has been defined as a priority at political level. The first step towards 
compliance with the requirements has been Ukraine‟s membership in GRECO, as a result of entry 
into force in January 2006 of the Civil Law Convention on Corruption25. GRECO carried out an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures employed by the Ukrainian 
authorities and adopted its peer review in March 2007. On the basis of the evaluation GRECO 
formulated 25 recommendations to be addressed by the Ukrainian authorities. Recommendations 
concern a wide range of issues, such as institutional improvements (e.g. to establish a body 
responsible of overseeing the implementation of the national anti-corruption strategies or to record 
and gather reliable statistics on the use of disciplinary proceedings and sanctions in public 
administration), legislative changes (e.g. to introduce liability of legal persons for corruption 
offences), improvement of qualifications and working conditions of judges (e.g. to provide uniform 
training of the law enforcement staff and prosecutors, to improve the material conditions and 
                                               
25  Any state which becomes party to the Criminal or Civil Law Conventions on Corruption automatically accedes to 
GRECO and its evaluation procedures. Currently, GRECO comprises 46 member States (45 European States and the 
United States of America) (http: //coe.int/greco). 
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remuneration of judges)26. There is a general need in Ukraine to reform the criminal legislation and 
to close loopholes which allow allegedly corrupt persons to escape jurisdiction, to strengthen 
prosecution of corruption and to address the problem of immunity of senior officials. Only a small 
number of cases are being brought to courts, and even fewer result in convictions (Khavroniuk 
2009).   
The president of Ukraine adopted in September 2006 a concept paper On the Way to Integrity, which 
analysed risks and elaborated possible ways to prevent and fight corruption.   Efforts were made to 
initiate anti-corruption legislation towards the end of 2006, but its adoption was halted by the 
political crisis in 2007. An anticorruption plan was adopted in August 2007 to address a number of 
recommendations made by GRECO. (European Commission 2008)  
As a new government took office at the end of 2007 and a new governmental programme of 
activities was adopted in January 2008 – Ukrainian breakthrough: For People, not for Politicians, the 
Ministry of Justice proposed to revise the action plan in order to add some new measures. The 
draft has been publicly discussed, and public institutions and non-governmental organisations have 
been invited to submit proposals. But at the present time, the draft of the revised national anti-
corruption concept has not yet been adopted.  
In the course of the 2008, some measures were introduced to strengthen the fight against 
corruption in line with some of the recommendations addressed by GRECO. The measures 
included, inter alia, the creation of an Interagency Working Group on Anti-Corruption Issues, and 
the decision to establish the post of Government Agent for Anti-Corruption Policy, who was 
appointed in April 2009. At the same time draft legislation on the ratification of Council of Europe 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption were debated in the parliament and finally ratified in 
November 200927.   
Two years after issuing the assessment report and the 25 recommendations, GRECO evaluated in 
May 2009 the compliance of Ukraine with its recommendations. GRECO concluded that less than 
a third of the recommendations have been implemented satisfactory of dealt with in a satisfactory 
manner. Furthermore, even though not all recommendations were implemented satisfactory, 
almost all of them have been addressed in one or another way. (GRECO 2009) As it has been 
noted above, several of the recommendations require fundamental, sometimes constitutional 
changes, which is a long term process. In light of the complexity of the assignment and a turbulent 
                                               
26 The goal of this paragraph is to give an overview of the progress made by the Ukrainian authorities in fighting 
corruption. The detailed analysis and a complete list of the recommendations can be found in GRECO (2007).  
27 The Convention will enter into force for Ukraine on 1 March 2010.  
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political environment, it shows that the Ukrainian authorities anyway put efforts to make the fight 
of corruption more effective.  
In June 2009, three new laws were adopted to enter into force on 1 January 2010 – Law on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption, Law on Liability of Legal Persons for Corruption 
Offences, and Law on Some Changes to Legislative Acts about Responsibility for Corruption 
Offences. The laws were supposed to close the gaps in Ukrainian legislation in line with the 
international standards as recommended by GRECO. Nevertheless, in December 2009 the 
parliament voted for the extension of the enactment of the laws until April 2010, allegedly due to 
imperfection of some of its provisions. The laws have been criticised for being too restrictive, 
forbidding and repressive, which may lead to their misuse in political and private interests in order 
to remove a political opponent, a public employee or business competitors. (Melnyk & 
Khavroniuk, 2009)  
It should be noted that plans, strategies and legislation require implementation in practice, which 
needs strong commitment that goes far beyond the elaboration of the legislation. Kuchma‟s 
strategies and long speeches about the need to fight corruption are well-known. The first law on 
combat of the corruption dates back to 1995. Later, in 1998, the presidential anti-corruption 
concept was presented. Nevertheless, the instruments turned out not to be effective at all.                  
In contrast to positive developments since 2005 in the efforts of Ukrainian authorities to combat 
corruption, the effects of these efforts do not actually transpose in practise. This is, for example, 
witnessed by the public perceptions of corruption, which continuously deteriorated since 2005. 
Consequently Ukraine dropped from 107th place in 2005 to 146th place in 2009 in Transparency 
International‟s Perceptions of Corruption Index. If compared with the neighbouring EU members, 
Poland and Romania, the trend has been completely different. Thus, Poland rose from 70th place in 
2005 to 49th place in 2009, and Romania rose from 85th place in 2005 to 71st place in 200928. 
According to Transparency International, fewer than 1 in 10 respondents in Ukraine considered 
government anti-corruption efforts to be effective and name political parties, parliament, public 
officials and judiciary as extremely corrupt institutions in Ukraine. (Transparency International 
2009)  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
Ukraine has moved forward in implementing the democratic reforms since the adoption of the AP. 
Nevertheless, the progress in carrying out the reforms necessary for the strengthening of the 
                                               
28 Data is available at the homepage of Transparency International http://www.transparency.org 
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stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law has been slow. 
It seems that the necessity of the reforms is recognised at the political level. Even though the 
elections are democratic and the media are much freer in comparison with the Kuchma times, the 
constitutional system of checks and balances is not in place, and local self-governance is not able to 
perform its functions, and corruption is wide-spread despite a number of legislative initiatives. A 
lot remains to be done before Ukraine come closer to the standards required by the EU.  
 
But is the approach applied by the EU is capable of bringing the necessary changes in Ukraine? 
This question will be answered in the analysis of the next chapter.   
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6. UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL CONTEXT      
In the following I will analyse the EU‟s approach to the promotion of democratic reforms in 
Ukraine projected upon the Ukrainian national conditions and characteristics of political elites and 
society in general. The analysis will be guided by the following research questions: 
 Do the EU‟s offers live up to the expectations of the Ukrainian political elites and 
society?   
 How important are the EU‟s priority requirements for the Ukrainian population? 
 What characterises the political structures and processes in Ukraine? 
 To what extent does the Ukrainian society identify itself as being European? 
 What are the characteristic traits of the Ukrainian participation traditions and civil 
society? 
 
First, the relationship between the EU‟s offers identified in chapter 4 and expectations of the 
Ukrainian political elites and society about the character of cooperation with the EU is analysed in 
paragraph 6.1. In paragraph 6.2, I will look at what societal problems are identified by the 
Ukrainian population as urgent and have to be addressed as the first priority. Afterwards, I turn to 
the analysis of the Ukrainian political structures and processes (paragraph 6.3). And finally, in 
paragraph 6.4, the elements of the Ukrainian political culture (European identification and 
participation traditions) and the characteristics of civil society will be discussed.           
   
6.1 The EU’s Offers and Ukrainian Expectations   
“We, as a country with EU aspirations, we were never concerned by the 
ENP. Ukraine is not a neighbour of the EU. It is part of it.” 
(Deputy Head of the Ukraine's Mission to the EU, Vasyl 
Filipchuk. Source: Agence Europe, 28 September 2009) 
 
In following, the EU‟s offers of upgrading in the scope and intensity of political cooperation, 
deeper economic integration and establishment of a FTA, possibility to participate in EU policies 
and programmes promoting cultural, educational, environmental, technical and scientific links, and 
establishment of a visa-free regime are discussed. These benefits are analysed through the prism of 
Ukraine‟s ambition to become a member of the EU or as Ukrainians say eurointegratsia 
(eurointegration). First I will look at the level of political elites and afterwards at society at large.       
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6.1.1 Political elites 
The Ukrainian political scene is characterised by numerous political entities, many of which are 
unstable with vague political and ideological platforms, changing memberships and weak links with 
the electorate. The main parties are represented in the parliament, Verkhovna Rada, and reflect the 
foreign policy preferences of the Ukrainian political elites. In the following I will analyse the 
positions of the main political parties, which represent the views of Ukrainian political elites and 
influence the outcomes of political decision-making process. But before turning to the analysis of 
the positions of the political parties dominating the political arena after the Orange revolution, I 
will take a step back and take a short look at the Ukrainian reactions to the launch of the ENP in 
2003 which prepared grounds for the conclusion of the AP in 2005.   
As it has been mentioned earlier, Ukraine declared its European aspirations back in 1993. But these 
aspirations remained just declarations, without any major progress in getting closer to “European 
shared values”.     
The preparation of the ENP has been influenced by the nondemocratic and authoritarian 
developments in the last years of Kuchma rule. The lack of membership perspective and placement 
of Ukraine in the same basket with the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East countries, 
which has never expressed the ambition joining the Union, had an effect of a cold shower for 
Ukrainian political elites. The speaker of the Verkhovna Rada at that time, Volodymyr Lytvyn, 
described the Wider Europe communication as degrading, and the Ministry of Foreign Relations 
called it disappointing and with a potential to create a dividing line between the EU and Ukraine, 
which “is not acceptable by Ukraine” (Kuzio 2003: 21; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 2003).   
Officially, Ukrainian foreign policy makers welcomed the ENP as a step toward strengthening 
relations with the EU, while it was perceived as “a stepping stone rather than an alternative to the country‟s 
prospect of EU membership” (Wolczuk 2004: 6).    
The Orange Revolution demonstrated popular support of the democratic values and brought to 
power new political elites, who declared the new era in Ukraine‟s relationship with the EU, and 
promised real actions in contrast to Kuchma‟s declarative practises. Viktor Yushchenko, newly 
elected president of Ukraine, declared in his inauguration speech on 23 January 2005, that “the place 
of Ukraine is in the EU” and that his aim is to bring Ukraine into the united Europe (Olijnyk & 
Sonjuk 2005).    
The Orange Revolution raised the high expectations of a breakthrough in Ukraine‟s relations with 
the EU, which nevertheless remained unanswered. Some observers expected, that the “Hour of 
Europe” in Ukraine would be echoed by an “Hour of Ukraine” in Europe (Wolczuk 2007: 11). But 
the EU strongly opposed to talk about the membership question and insisted on adherence to the 
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principles of the ENP, including the adoption of the AP, which was finalised in September 2004 
under Kuchma‟s presidency.  
The new Ukrainian leadership was reluctant about the signature of the AP negotiated under 
Kuchma, but agreed to sign it in February 2005, accepting it as a short-term framework for 
cooperation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented on this occasion that “Cooperation within 
the framework of the EU-Ukraine Action plan cannot be regarded as an alternative to Ukraine‟s accession to the 
EU” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 2005).         
Dissatisfaction with the ENP was clearly expressed by Ukrainian officials in the aftermath of the 
Orange Revolution. The conclusion of the AP was viewed by the Ukrainian side not as a tool of 
the ENP, but as “a document that would help Ukraine implement some reforms at home, to promptly prepare the 
basis for further relations”  (Dir 2007: 159), and the character of these future relations were expected to  
be of political association paving the way to EU membership.   
But this was the position expressed by the newly elected Orange coalition led by Viktor 
Yushchenko. But were these expectations about EU-Ukraine relations actually supported by other 
political forces?  
Ukrainian parties do not have a clear-cut ideological profile, with the exception of the Communist 
Party of Ukraine (CPU). Other parties are predominantly “personalised”, i.e. centred around their 
charismatic political leader. What distinct them, is their pro-reform and pro-democratic orientation, 
and the geopolitical preferences towards closer cooperation with the West (EU/USA) or the East 
(Russia/CIS).  
Since the Orange revolution and consecutive parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007 the political 
scene of Ukraine has been dominated by three main forces: the political bloc “Our Ukraine” led by 
Viktor Yushchenko, the bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT), the Party of Regions (PoR) led by 
Viktor Yanukovych. The Communist Party is not numerous any more, but managed to keep its 
positions in the parliament. The once popular Socialist Party led by Alexandr Moroz lost its 
positions in the 2007 pre-term parliamentary elections and its place was occupied by the Lytvyn 
Bloc (table 3).  
These political parties are expected to dominate the agenda of January 2010 election campaign and 
the winner will determine the character of Ukraine‟s relations toward the EU.           
 
Table 2. Results of the 2006 parliamentary elections and the 2007 pre-term parliamentary elections 
Political party 2006 2007 
Party of Regions (PoR)  32.14 34.37 
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Blok of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) 22.29 30.71 
Blok “Our Ukraine”29  13.95 14.15 
Socialist Party of Ukraine  5.69 - 
Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) 3.66 5.39 
Blok Lytvyn 2.4430 3.96 
Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine (http://www.cvk.gov.ua) 
 
All political forces represented in the parliament show to support Ukraine‟s European choice. 
Nevertheless, the differences are quite clear in respect to their approaches and ambitions regarding 
Ukraine‟s relations with the EU. 
  
Our Ukraine/Viktor Yushchenko     
The goal of Ukraine‟s membership in the EU, declared by Yushchenko in his inauguration speech 
in 2005, has been at several occasions endorsed by himself and by members of Our Ukraine. 
Moreover, Yushchenko repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the current level of 
relationships and the lack of a clear message from the EU about Ukraine‟s membership 
perspectives. He called for a “signal” from the EU.    
Thus, in an interview in March 2007 he said that even though Ukraine has received much more 
from the EU (market economy status, visa negotiations) since 2005 than during the whole previous 
decade, Ukraine still needs to know its membership perspective. He explained that membership 
perspective should become a kind of a “lighthouse”, which will guide Ukrainian politics. 
(Yushchenko 2007) 
This position has been endorsed by Natalia Prokopovych31, representing “Our Ukraine” in the 
parliament, at a conference devoted to the assessment of the implementation of the AP in March 
2007. She emphasised that this decision will be of a great importance for Ukraine‟s progress in 
compliance with the EU requirements: “Europe should decide whether it needs Ukraine or not. This is the 
main issue. Then we will know what we should do next, whether we should accelerate our progress or not.” 
Furthermore, the motivation for joining the EU is the creation for Ukrainian citizens of “the 
                                               
29 In the 2007 parliamentary elections the bloc changed name to bloc “Our Ukraine – People‟s Self-Defence”, but was 
dominated by pro-presidential people from “Our Ukraine”. The bloc retained its association with the ideals of the 
Orange Revolution.   
30 Blok Lytvyn was not represented in the Verkhovna Rada, as it did not receive the required 3% of votes to enter the 
parliament.  
31 Nataliya Prokopovych headed the parliamentary committee of European integration in 2007.  
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conditions for general and economic development, social protection, which exist in the European community .” 
(Prokopovych 2007)    
During a his last visit to Brussels in October 2009, when asked if he was satisfied with the relations 
between Ukraine and the EU, Yushchenko answered, that Ukraine achieved some success in its 
integration to Europe through cooperation in many directions including visa issues, education and 
science, thus becoming more important for Europe. But the question of foundations of the EU-
Ukraine relations remains to be clarified: “The fact that Ukraine becomes more and more significant for 
Europe will one day force Europeans to ask themselves: if Ukraine is so important for Europe, why is it not member 
of the EU?” (Yushchenko 2009a)  
Membership in the EU is accentuated in Yushchenko‟s 2010 election programme: “My goal – is a 
membership of Ukraine in the EU. Citizens of Ukraine will feel the benefits of European direction. Ukrainians 
will have the right to visa-free travel to the EU, their rights abroad will be protected.” (Yushchenko 2009b)      
Thus, Yushchenko and “Our Ukraine” generally are positive about the EU‟s offers of deepening 
political cooperation, establishment of a free trade area, visa facilitation and bringing Ukrainian 
legislation in line with European norms. But they are not satisfied with the EU‟s offers and pursue 
a more ambitious goal – an offer of a membership perspective.  
 
 
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT)  
BYuT as an ally in Orange coalition has been a strong supporter of strengthening Ukraine‟s 
relations with the EU. It has been positive about deepening of economic integration, establishment 
of FTA, conclusion of at visa facilitation agreement. In many ways the positions of Tymoshenko 
coincide with those of Yushchenko.  
At the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council in March 2008, Tymoshenko described the initiation in 
February 2008 of the official negotiations about the establishment of a FTA between Ukraine and 
the EU, as a “remarkable” event for Ukraine. She was also positive about the entry into force of the 
visa facilitation agreement, which she regarded as “the first step” towards deepening of cooperation 
on visa questions, the end goal of which should be the establishment of a visa-free regime between 
Ukraine and the EU (Tymoshenko 2008).        
Though, there are also clear differences. Tymoshenko does not condition Ukraine‟s European 
choice and reforms on a formulation of a clear message from the EU about Ukraine‟s membership 
perspectives. She regards European integration as a priority for domestic policy. According to 
Tymoshenko, the process of European integration is incompatible with Ukraine‟s participation in 
Single Economic Space, promoted by Russia.  
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In contrast to Yushchenko, Tymoshenko put priorities in reverse order. First, the reforms should 
be implemented in Ukraine so that Ukraine can reach European standards of democracy, rule of 
law, political culture and economy, and afterwards Ukraine can join the EU. She declares in her 
2010 presidential election programme “When we have built Europe in Ukraine, Ukraine will join the EU” 
(GazetaUa 2009).        
 
Party of Regions (PoR) /Viktor Yanukovych 
The PoR and its leader Viktor Yanukovych emerged in the wake of the 2004 presidential elections 
as a successor for Kuchma‟s power party. Its strongholds is in Eastern Ukraine (Russian-speaking 
Donbas region), and it enjoyed a strong Russian support during the Orange Revolution. The PoR 
has never denied the European choice of Ukraine, but its ambitions regarding Ukraine‟s European 
cooperation has been quite modest in comparison with Our Ukraine.     
Yanukovych takes a pragmatic position towards relationships with the EU, focusing on economic 
cooperation, the FTA, visa facilitation but without demanding promises of membership. During 
his period as a Prime Minister in August 2006-December 2007, Yanukovych tried to distance 
himself from Yushchenko‟s demands of membership in the EU, and pursued the agenda of 
economic integration. Thus, during his visit to Brussels in September 2006, he confirmed the 
interest of Ukraine in FTA with the EU, but he did not mention association. (Leshchenko 2006) 
But behind the public declarations, the actions of Yanukovych talk for themselves. One of his first 
decisions was the abolishment of the government committee on European and Euro-atlantic 
integration, headed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and allocation of the European portfolio to 
first Deputy Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov, who was also in change of the financial affairs. 
Azarov can hardly be described as a strong proponent of Ukraine‟s European integration. Quite on 
the contrary, he has been a strong supporter of Ukraine‟s integration in the Common Economic 
Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, on which he worked in 2002-2003 under Kuchma 
(Sushko 2006). 
The 2010 presidential election programme of Yanukovych reveals a set of different priorities, 
which are formulated as: “To renew the friendly and mutually beneficial relations with Russia, CIS countries, to 
ensure strategic partnership with the USA, the EU and G20 countries” (Yanukovych 2009). The PoR shows 
to produce declarations about Ukraine‟s European integration, while in practice its priorities are 
placed eastwards and directed at developing closer ties with Russia and CIS countries.     
 
Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU)/Petro Symonenko 
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The CPU is a traditional strongholder of pro-Russian orientation. It has not denied Ukraine‟s  
European choice, but has been definitely less supportive, if supportive at all, about Ukraine‟s 
integration with the EU. The CPU continues the old soviet rhetoric of the EU as an enemy, trying 
to exploit Ukraine in its own interest.   
Petro Symonenko, the leader of the CPU, at several occasions criticised Ukraine‟s cooperation with 
the EU, the process of trade liberalisation and establishment of FTA, visa issues etc. Thus, 
Symonenko criticised the conditions put forward by the EU about abolitions of some export and 
import tariffs (on export of metallurgy products and import of used cars) in the process of 
Ukraine‟s accession to the WTO. In his view, as a result of EU conditions, Ukraine would end up 
as waste territory for gathering of dangerous technologies servicing high-tech productions of 
European countries. In his opinion, the EU does not regard Ukraine as an equal partner and sets 
humiliating conditions for Ukraine (Symonenko 2005). 
In the same spirit Symonenko criticises the situation with visa issues. He finds the one-sided visa-
free regime for citizens of the EU – “the so called European democracy”, as unacceptable and called for 
introduction of visas for both European countries and the USA, and thereby “to stop humiliation of 
our people, humiliation of our country”. He compares EU requirement of biometrical control of 
Ukrainian citizens when proceeding visas with checking criminals during detention: “... now those, 
who want to come closer to the “European values” have to, as criminals in detention, leave their fingerprints in order 
to get a visa” (Symonenko 2009a). For the CPU the future of Ukraine is closely connected with 
Russia: “We will achieve nothing without cooperation with Russia” (Symonenko 2009b).    
Thus, neither the idea of Ukraine‟s European integration, nor the benefits proposed by the EU 
resonate with the expectations of the CPU.  
 
Bloc Lytvyn 
Volodymyr Lytvyn, the former head of Kuchma‟s presidential administration (1999-2002) and the 
current speaker of the parliament, is a proponent of both the implementation of the Single 
Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and the conclusion of a cooperation 
agreement with the EU about free movement of persons, goods, services and capitals (Lytvyn 
2009). In his opinion, the two directions are not exclusive, but supplementary. In his interpretation, 
Ukraine needs European integration in order to strengthen its economic development, but not in 
order to create some kind of a supranational structure with powerful competencies.    
Lytvyn‟s approach can be described as: cooperate with those, who provide more benefits, especially 
in economic sphere. It does not matter, whether it is Europe, Russia or others.   
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In sum, Ukrainian political elites, with the exception of the CPU, and to some extent the POR, 
seem to be supportive about Ukraine‟s European integration. Though, the degree of coincidence 
between the EU‟s offers and expectations of Ukrainian political elites varies. Those parties, which 
are considered to be mostly pro-reform and pro-democratic parties - Our Ukraine and BYuT - are 
not completely satisfied with the EU‟s current offers. Both parties seek EU‟s membership, but in a 
different ways. Our Ukraine calls for a clear message from EU about Ukraine‟s potential accession 
to the organisation as a necessary factor for further reforms, including the reforms of democratic 
institutions. In contrast, BYuT considers domestic transformations in line with European standards 
as a way of achieving membership in the EU.  
PoR officially declares its interest in closer political ties with the EU, in the establishment of FTA 
and visa-free travel, but in practice it takes actions towards establishment of closer ties with Russia. 
In this way, the party continues the declarative approach of the Kuchma.  
CPU is strongly pro-Russian, and its interests in the EU and the proposed benefits are limited. It 
views Ukraine‟s future in close company with Russia and regards EU‟s initiatives as hostile 
attempts of exploitation of Ukrainian resources and people.   
Lytvyn finds benefits proposed by the EU as useful as those resulting from cooperation with 
Russia. The two directions are mutually complimentary as both of them are regarded as beneficial 
for Ukraine.   
         
6.1.2 Ukrainian Society  
EU membership 
In contrast to the Ukrainian political elites, Ukrainian society is not so keen on Ukraine‟s 
membership perspective in the EU. According to nation-wide polls held by the Razumkov Centre 
in 2004-2008, on the average about half of the respondents believe that Ukraine should join the 
EU, nearly a third is against and around a fifth is not decided (see diagram 1). The level of support 
fluctuated with the lowest level of support (40%) in September 2005, when the Orange Coalition 
split and Yushchenko dismissed Tymoshenko from the post as prime-minister, and the highest 
level (54%) in December 2007, when Yanukovych was dismissed and Tymoshenko was again 
appointed as the head of government. There was a clear falling tendency in support rates of 
Ukraine‟s membership in the EU in 2008.  Thus, 51% of the population believed in February 2008 
that Ukraine needed to join the EU, while in December 2008 the idea of EU membership were 
supported by 45% (Razumkov Centre 2008a and 2008 b).   
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Figure 2. Societal support for Ukraine‟s membership in the EU32. 
 
There are clear regional differences in support of Ukraine‟s eventual EU membership (cf. annex 1). 
According to the results of the latest available survey carried out in April 2008, the western 
oblasts33 are mostly in favour of Ukraine‟s EU membership (77.0%), the central oblasts are 
predominantly supporting the idea (56.4%), while the share of the population in eastern and 
southern oblasts, who support the idea of Ukraine‟s membership in the EU is much lower 
(respectively 33.8% and 36.8%). The number of those, who oppose Ukraine‟s EU membership, is 
almost two times higher in the east and the south (respectively 43.3% and 47.0%) than those 
opposing the idea in the centre (23.5%) and more than four times higher than those opposing the 
idea in the west (8.6%). Instead, the population in eastern and southern oblasts are predominantly 
in favour of developing closer ties with Russia: 66% in eastern and 61% in southern oblasts believe 
that closer cooperation with Russia should be a foreign policy priority. In contrast, only 9% in 
western and 29% in central oblasts want closer relations with Russia (Razumkov Centre 2008a: 42).    
Some regional differences in the trends in support rates of the idea of EU membership can be 
noticed. The share of supporters and opponents of Ukraine‟s membership has more or less stable 
character in the western and central parts. While the dynamics in the eastern and southern parts are 
                                               
32 Source: Compiled data from Razumkov Centre: Razumkov Centre (2008) Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona, no. 6 (100), 
p. 48, available at http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD100_ukr.pdf, and  survey data 
available at  http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=387 
33 Oblast is the largest territorial-administrative unit in Ukraine. For the regional division of oblasts see annex 3.   
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characterised by greater variations in the share of supporters and opponents of the membership 
perspective. In the eastern part, the percentage of supporters and opponents has been unstable and 
in some periods the share of supporters was higher than the share of opponents (April-June 2007, 
December 2007-February 2008). In the south, the share of opponents has been predominantly 
higher than the share of the supporters.  
A general trend can be traced in support rates, depending on the age of the population. The highest 
level of support of Ukraine‟s membership in the EU is demonstrated by the youth aged 18-29 
years. The older the population, the lower the level of support, and the higher the level of 
opposition (Razumkov Centre 2008a: 42). 
The results of public opinion surveys reveal a complex situation, if the support rates of Ukraine‟s 
EU membership are compared with the attitudes of population towards which foreign policy 
direction should constitute a priority for Ukraine. Even though almost half of the Ukrainian 
population believe that Ukraine needs to join the EU, only a third is of the opinion that Ukraine 
should develop closer relationships with EU countries. Whereas 40% of the population support the 
idea that Ukraine should develop closer ties with Russia (cf. annex 3). There is an inconsistency in 
support rates of Ukraine‟s EU membership and strengthening cooperation with Russia, which 
shows that many Ukrainians do not see any contradiction between seeking the EU membership 
and strengthening cooperation with Russia.  
Nevertheless, when asked if the new association agreement between Ukraine and the EU should 
contain a clear membership perspective, almost 60% of population answered “yes” in April 2008 
((Razumkov Centre 2008a: 50).     
 
Benefits of EU membership 
Even though the Ukrainian society is prevailingly positive about joining the EU, it is not 
completely clear about the actual benefits of this process. According to a 2008 survey, the share of 
those, who believe that they will personally benefit from Ukraine‟s integration to the EU is almost 
equal to the share of those, who could not actually answer what the benefits would be (34.6% and 
39.6% respectively) (Razumkov Centre 2008a: 51). The regional differences are also clear in this 
respect: the share of the population, who expect to benefit from EU integration is higher in 
western and central parts of Ukraine (55.5% and 40.1%), than the share of population in eastern 
and southern parts (20.5% and 26.8%). Notably, if the share of those, who expect either positive or 
negative consequences, differs across the oblasts, the share of those, who do not know what the 
benefits would be, is nearly the same (around 35-40%).   
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Positive assessments of personal benefits from Ukraine‟s accession to the EU are highest among 
the younger age groups (49.2% among 18-29 years) and are gradually falling in the older age groups 
(37.5%, 36.2% and 28.5% among 30-39 years, 40-49 years and 50-59 years, respectively) with the 
lowest share among those over 60 years (22.3%) (cf. annex 4).    
 
Priorities for cooperation  
Overwhelming majority (over 60%) of the Ukrainian population suggests that cooperation in the 
trade and economic sector should be a priority direction in cooperation with the EU. Much fewer 
respondents view cooperation in the political sector as a priority and their share has been gradually 
falling since 2005 (from 24.7% in 2005 to 18.9% in 2008). In contrast, the share of those 
supporting development of cooperation in educational, environmental and scientific-technical 
sectors has grown in 2008 in comparison with 2005 (from 22.0% to 26.7%, from 18.2% to 34.4%, 
from 26.6% to 28.9%, respectively). The interest in cultural cooperation ranks lowest. (Razumkov 
Centre Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona, no. 6 (100), 2008) 
Among the hypothetical positive consequences of Ukraine‟s accession to the EU, the free 
movement of persons gets the highest rank (69.7% in 2005 and 68.6% in 2008). This is followed by 
such positive consequences as the improvement of the international image of Ukraine, the 
strengthening of democracy and the increase of economic welfare of the Ukrainian population. 
Increasing immigration to other EU countries, placement of environmentally dangerous industries, 
and decline in national production levels and increase in unemployment rank highest among the 
negative potential consequences. In contrast, the majority of population (52.3%) is positive about 
the initiation of negotiations about the creation of a FTA between Ukraine and the EU, a fifth is 
negatively inclined and almost a third is not decided (Razumkov Centre 2008a)..  
Public opinion surveys disclose the mismatch between the EU‟s declared interest in promoting 
democratic reforms in Ukraine and the societal perceptions of, why the EU is actually interested in 
cooperation with Ukraine. Thus, only 12.7% of Ukrainian population are of the opinion that the 
EU is interested in promoting democratic reforms in Ukraine, and this share has fallen in 
comparison with 2005, when 20.3% were of that opinion. Instead, the majority of respondents are 
of the view, that the EU is mostly interested in Ukraine‟s natural resources (50.3%) and in 
exporting goods to the Ukrainian market (46.6%) (Razumkov Centre 2008a: 45). 
The hierarchy in societal views about, what mainly hinders Ukraine‟s integration to the EU, differs 
to some extent from those of the EU. The EU defines democratic reforms as a necessary 
prerequisite for other reforms, including in the economic sector. In contrast, the Ukrainian 
population is of the opinion that the low level of economic development is the main obstacle to 
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Ukraine‟s EU integration (two thirds of the population supported this opinion in 2008). The low 
level of economic development is closely followed by the high level of corruption in Ukraine, and 
only 36% of respondents regard problems with democracy in Ukraine as obstacle to closer 
integration with the EU (Razumkov Centre 2008a: 46).     
 
6.1.3 Conclusion 
In this paragraph the relationship between the EU‟s offers and the expectations of the Ukrainian 
population has been analysed. The results of the analysis in order to answer the fourth research 
question Do the EU‟ offers live up to the expectations of Ukrainian political elites and society? are shown in 
the table 4:      
 
Table 3. Do the EU‟s offers match with the expectations of Ukrainian political elites and society? 
EU’s offers Ukrainian 
political 
elites 
Ukrainian 
society 
An upgrade in the scope and intensity of political 
cooperation  
+/- - 
Participation in the EU‟s internal market, continued 
reduction of trade barriers, further economic 
integration, including the establishment of a FTA 
 
+/- 
 
+/- 
Possibility for Ukraine to participate progressively in 
the EU policies and programmes promoting cultural, 
educational, environmental, technical and scientific 
links 
+ + 
Visa facilitation agreement and visa-free regime  + + 
Hypothetical: perspective of Ukraine’s EU 
membership  
+/- +/- 
 
The table shows that there exists some degree of mismatch between the EU‟s offers and 
expectations of the Ukrainian political elites and society.  
As regards an upgrade in the scope and intensity of political cooperation, Ukrainian political elites and society 
show divergent expectations. Furthermore, there are clear divisions among the political elites in this 
respect. Ukrainian society in general shows a low level of interest in developing political 
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cooperation with the EU. All political elites declare their interest in political cooperation with the 
EU, but in practice it shows, that PoR and Bloc Lytvyn would rather prefer to maintain the current 
level of political ties, and instead concentrate on practical issues such as economic and trade 
cooperation. CPU, which is supported by a very small proportion of the Ukrainian population, 
would rather prefer to phase out political relations with the EU, and reorient efforts to integration 
with Russia. Both Our Ukraine and BYuT demonstrate high interest in intensification of political 
cooperation with the EU.   
Both political elites and society are divided in respect to Participation in the EU‟s internal market, 
continued reduction of trade barriers, further economic integration, including the establishment of a FTA. Among 
political elites, Our Ukraine, BYuT and PoR and Bloc Lytvyn turn to be in favour of deep 
economic integration with the EU. CPU is not interested. There are further differences between 
the four parties. While Our Ukraine and BYuT tend to give a higher priority to economic 
integration with the EU, Bloc Lytvyn views it as a complimentary to close economic integration 
with Russia and POR ranks trade relationship with Russia higher than with the EU.  
Possibility for Ukraine to participate progressively in the EU policies and programmes promoting cultural, 
educational, environmental, technical and scientific links is not denied by the political elites, but ranks rather 
low on the list of expectations towards benefits from the EU. Society follows the same example, 
but there is a slight growing tendency in the interest regarding educational, environmental, 
technical and scientific cooperation, whereas societal interest in cultural cooperation remains low.  
The interest of political elites (with the exception of CPU) and society is high as regards visa 
facilitation agreement and visa-free regime. The majority of the Ukrainian population gives the highest 
rank to the free movement of persons as a would-be positive benefit of Ukraine‟s accession to the 
EU and support initiation of the negotiations on FTA.  
Both the political elites and society are divided about the perspective of Ukraine‟s EU membership. Our 
Ukraine and BYuT seek membership on the EU and are not satisfied with the current EU offers. 
Though, they have different approaches to the questions. Our Ukraine demands a clear message 
from the EU on Ukraine‟s membership perspective, which determines their wish to implement 
reforms. In contrast, BYuT prioritize domestic transformations as a way of achieving EU 
membership. PoR, CPU and Bloc Lytvyn have no ambitions about Ukraine‟s EU membership.  
About half of the Ukrainian population wants to join the EU. At the same time, there is a clear 
geographical cleavage between western and central oblasts on the one hand, and eastern and 
southern oblasts on the other hand. The Population in the west and centre demonstrates much 
higher level of support of Ukraine‟s EU membership, than the population in the east and south. 
Though, the dynamic in support rates reveals some signs of instability in views among populations 
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in the eastern provinces, where in some periods the share of supporters has been higher than the 
share of opponents. This evidences that eastern population has potential to change their negative 
opinion about Ukraine‟s EU integration.  
There is a general trend in support rates among different age groups. The younger the population 
the higher the levels of support.  
It should be noted, that the Ukrainian population demonstrates a low level of understanding of the 
actual benefits of EU membership. Almost 40% of the population do not know what their benefits 
would be if Ukraine joined the EU.  
Furthermore, there is a clear mismatch between the EU‟s declared goal to promote democratic 
reforms in Ukraine as a first priority of its action, and the societal perceptions of, why the EU 
engages in Ukraine. A very small proportion of the population is of the opinion that the EU is 
actually interested in promoting democracy in Ukraine. The majority of the population is 
convinced that the EU wants to exploit Ukrainian natural resources and export goods to Ukraine.  
The EU and the Ukrainian population do not share a common understanding of what poses a 
major obstacle for Ukraine‟s accession to the EU. The EU defines democratic reforms as the most 
important issue, whereas the Ukrainian population sees its problem in the low level of economic 
development, which is followed by the corruption 
 
6.2 The EU’s requirements and the priorities of the Ukrainian 
population  
Having looked at the match between the EU‟s offers and the expectations of the Ukrainian 
political elites and society, in the following I will look at which priority is attached by the Ukrainian 
population to the priority directions regarding democratic reforms identified by the EU (free 
elections, free media, constitutional reform, reform of public administration and local self-
government, corruption, cf. paragraph 4.4). In the following the fifth research question How 
important are the EU‟s priority requirements for the Ukrainian population? will be answered.  
The analysis of hierarchy of societal problems assessed by the Ukrainian population as those that 
have to be addressed as a priority reveals a mismatch between the priorities for action defined by 
the EU.  
The Ukrainian population ranks resolving of socio-economic problems, such as low levels of 
salaries and pensions and high levels of unemployment, as an issue of first priority. For example, in 
2006, 62% of the population were of the opinion that low level of salaries and pensions has to be 
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addressed as a priority.  43% of respondents were of the opinion that problems with 
unemployment and finding job pose a priority problem (Razumkov Centre 2006).   
The second place is occupied by corruption in public sector. If compared with 2000, the share of 
the population who regards this as a problem of urgent importance has grown. Thus, in 2000, 31% 
of the population ranked corruption as a priority problem. In 2006, the same problem was ranked 
as a first priority by 40.5%.  
Further down on the list of priorities is the incompetency of all levels of governmental institutions. 
23 % of the Ukrainians believe that this is a problem of high priority.  
Political reform and biased media are placed at the bottom of societal priority list. Only 3.2% and 
2.5% of respondents assess these issues as priorities.  
The Ukrainian society is rather sceptical about the importance of free elections. Thus, according to 
one survey, in November 2005, only 23% of the respondents agreed that elections lead to a more 
democratic society and 35% disagreed (Freedom House 2006). 
The Ukrainian society demonstrates low level of understanding of the importance of constitutional 
reform for ensuring political stability in the country. According to a 2008 survey, 35.7 % regard 
constitutional reform as a way of getting out of the political crisis. Every fourth Ukrainian citizen 
do not actually know if it will help, and 36.2 % do not think constitutional reform is the right 
solution (Razumkov Centre 2008c).  
The level of awareness of the Ukrainian population about the constitutional reform agreed upon in 
2004 is low. According to a 2006 survey, only 40 % of the population responded that they know 
about constitutional changes agreed in 2004. 56 % of the respondents have not formed any 
position towards constitutional changes or do not care (Razumkov Centre 2007).    
The same situation can be seen in respect to the reform of local self-government. The majority of 
the Ukrainian population supports the need of the reform, but at the same time the level of 
understanding of the actual content of the reform is very low (Viche 2005). 
 
Thus, there is a clear mismatch between the EU priorities for action and those of the Ukrainian 
society. Only fighting corruption has the same, high level of priority among the Ukrainian 
population. Democratic elections, constitutional reform are of low priority for the Ukrainian 
population. Freedom of the media is ranked as very low. Table 5 summarises points of 
compatibility and non-compatibility. 
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Table 4. How important are the EU‟s priorities for the Ukrainian population   
The EU’ priorities Priority for the Ukrainian 
society 
Ensuring democratic conduct of elections Low 
Freedom of the media Very low 
Constitutional reform Low 
Administrative reform  Very low 
Strengthening local self-government   Low 
Fight against corruption  High 
   
Having identified the hierarchy of the problem issues among the Ukrainian population, I will now 
turn to the analysis of the characteristics of the Ukrainian political structures and processes in the 
next paragraph.  
 
6.3 Political structures and processes  
“The problem in Ukraine is not just it lacks rule of law, but that it has 
rule by law, in which the law is a weapon to be selectively applied against 
one‟s adversaries.”  
(D‟Anieri 2007: 12) 
 
6.3.1 Bridging the past – oligarchization of power   
The Orange Revolution brought freer elections and freer media environment. But it failed to 
become a “critical juncture” as the elements of the old regime remained intact. 
Ukraine‟s political development since gaining independence in 1991 has been highly influenced by 
the soviet legacies. The Communist Party‟s monopoly on power and the state control of the entire 
economy created a culture of political centralisation and contributed to powerful incentives of 
corruption. Political power was a necessary condition for obtaining economic power and wealth. 
And vice versa, economic power was necessary to acquire political influence.  
In the course of the post-soviet transition, this interweaving of political and economic power led to 
a creation of a number of powerful groups closely connected with the state apparatus – the so 
called oligarchs. In contrast to Central European countries, there was no political revolution in 
Ukraine as the focus was more on national independence rather than political change (D‟Anieri 
2007: 13). Oligarchs are the product of nomenclatura privatization, when the old soviet elite used 
their access to administrative apparatus to obtain ownership in economic enterprises. In the 
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context of total economic turmoil and the level of inflation up to 4000%34 per year, buying state 
property was quite a profitable affair. In this way, the old soviet elites transformed into self-
enriching “democratic reformers”, providing for protection of the interests of economically 
powerful groups.  
The consolidation of Kuchma‟s “party of power” was connected with spreading of corruption in 
political and judicial institutions, harassment of opposition leaders, electoral fraud and crackdowns 
on independent media. The Orange revolution was brought on the slogans of removing the 
corrupt Kuchma‟s government and establishment of a fair and democratic government system. 
The aftermath of the Orange Revolution has been disappointing on this point. Just a couple of 
months after the Revolution, there appeared isolated incidents of corruption. The story about a 
luxurious lifestyle35 of a 19 year old son of Yushchenko and the president‟s threatening reactions 
towards journalist, the lies of Justice Minister, Roman Zvarych, about his academic credentials, 
raised doubts about the intentions of the Orange government. 
Observers began to talk about a culture of corruption among the Orangists, and pointed out at the 
similarities between the new Orange government and the previous Kuchma‟s governments 
expressed in lack of a moral and ethical culture. One critic, previously largely supportive of 
Yushchenko, explained: “They are the people of soviet era, Komsomol generation.” (Ryabchuk 2009) 
The following developments, when Oleksandr Zinchenko, Yushchenko‟s former campaign 
manager, accused high-ranking officials in the presidential administration and Prime Minister 
Tymoshenko36 of various forms of corruption, led to dismissal of Tymoshenko, the so called 
“Orange Divorce”, in September 2005.  
The cause of the unsustainability of the coalition is to be found in its oligarchic character. The once 
Orange allies were composed of numerous actors, who became fabulously wealthy in Kuchma 
times. Actually, the Orange Revolution did not bring the change in political elites, but instead 
contributed to further “oligarchization of power” (Kubicek 2009: 332). 
Just to name Petro Poroshenko (former head of the Council of National Security and Defence, 
Head of the National Bank and Minister for Foreign Affairs from October 2009), Davyd Zhvania 
(Minister of Emergency Situations in first Tymoshenko government), Yevgen Chervonenko 
(Minister of Transport in 2007-2008 and the head of national agency supervising preparations to 
European Championship 2012), Andrij Kliujev (vice prime-minister of energy affairs in 
                                               
34 Registered in 1993. 
35 Andriy Yushchenko was seen driving the luxurious BMW M6, which price was estimated to 133.000 euro, and using 
extremely expensive mobile phone "Vertu", which costs several thousand euro (Ukrayinska Pravda, 19 July 2005, 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/4b1a99d1c80f7)  
36 Tymoshenko was accused in initiating re-privatisation schemes in order to get rid of her own debts.   
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Yanukovych government), Sergij Buriak (Head of Tax Administration  in second  Tymoshenko 
government), who are among the richest people in Ukraine37.   
The leaders of Orange coalition did not distance themselves from the people of the old “party of 
power”. Instead, they concluded deals with them. Thus, Yushchenko entered into agreement with 
Yanukovych and his allies in order to get support for the approval of Tymoshenko‟s successor, 
Yuri Yekhanurov. The price for support was the guarantee of immunity from possible prosecution 
for electoral fraud and no investigations of doubtful privatisation deals in the 1990s. (Fraser 2008; 
Kubicek 2009) The choice of Yuri Yekhanurov is prominent in this respect. Yekhanurov, who inter 
alia started and later oversaw mass privatisation under Kuchma, was the first head deputy of 
Kuchma‟s presidential administration in 2001, later responsible for implementation of 
administrative reform in Ukraine. This step undermined credibility of Yushchenko and his, 
previously unquestioned, democratic integrity.     
No wonder, that the split of the Orange Coalition has been discouraging for the population. The 
results of the 2006 parliamentary elections did little help. After three months of negotiation, the 
former Orange allies, Our Ukraine, BYuT and the Socialists created a coalition, which fell apart 
within two weeks. The reason: inability to agree on distribution of the key posts in the government 
and the parliament. Socialists‟ Moroz wanted the post of parliament speaker, but Our Ukraine 
proposed its own candidate, well-known businessmen, Petro Poroshenko.  
Meanwhile, Yanukovych retained the support from many prominent oligarchs and electorate in 
eastern and southern Ukraine. He built his campaign on recognizing Russian as a second state 
language, re-establishing close ties with Moscow, and providing strong leadership able to deliver 
social benefits to the population. PoR was able to mobilise “all its financial resources in order to penetrate 
key state institutions and to buy up all those who could be bought” (Sherr 2006). 
But the ambitions of Moroz could be satisfied by the PoR. Moroz switched sides and entered the 
newly proclaimed “anti-crisis” majority coalition led by PoR, with the following appointment of 
Yanukovych as a prime-minister in August 2006.  
The record of Yanukovych government has been dubious. The coalition concentrated power 
battles with Yushchenko which culminated with the unconstitutional adoption of the law on 
Cabinet of Ministers in January 2007 (cf. paragraph 5.3 about constitutional reform) and led to the 
political crisis and pre-term parliamentary elections in September 2007. Besides, the Yanukovych 
government launched investigations of its opponents, closed political debate programmes on state 
                                               
37 Detailed information about Ukrainian oligarchic groups can be found in Åslund, Anders (2006) The Ancien Régime: 
Kuchma and Oligarchs, in Revolution in Orange: the Origins of Ukraine‟s Democratic Breakthrough edited by Anders 
Åslund and Michael McFaul, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 9-28; and Wilson, 
Andrew (2005) Ukraine‟s Orange Revolution, New Haven and London: Yale University Press 
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television. It facilitated the sale of the largest power-producing enterprise in Ukraine, 
Dniproenergo, to Rinat Akhmetov, the richest man in Ukraine and prominent member of PoR. 
Sergey Kovalov, the tainted head of the Central Election Committee returned to his old post, and 
resumed his old practices trying to prevent members of BYuT to appear on the ballot. (Kubicek 
2009: 335)    
The pre-term parliamentary elections on 30 September 2007 brought the leaders of Orange 
Revolution back in power. But the creation of coalition government between Our Ukraine and 
BYuT turned to be a long-drawn process. Tymoshenko‟s candidacy to prime minister post was 
approved after second attempt by a small majority on 18 December 2007, i.e. 2.5 months after the 
elections.  
Thus, the political processes in Ukraine are characterised by the oligarchization of power. The 
Orange Revolution failed to prevent the return of the old elites, which successfully returned and 
continue their corrupt practices. Political elites have close connections to economic interests, which 
blurs the dividing line between public and private spheres.  
 
6.3.2 Power politics and institutional change 
As it has been noted before, Ukrainian political elites often try to pursue their goals by getting 
round the established rules, or by changing unsuitable rules so that they serve their interests. This 
has been described as a power politics (D‟Anieri 2007).   
Formal institutional arrangements do not appear by themselves. They are the products of the 
power and interests of the actors that design them. The adoption of Ukrainian constitution in 1996 
and agreement on the constitutional changes in 2004 are telling examples of designing institutional 
arrangements suitable for protection of the interests of powerful actors. After becoming president 
in 1994, Kuchma was interested in consolidating his power, which led to creation of a strong 
presidency, which was enshrined in the 1996 Constitution. Eight years later, a growing popular 
dissatisfaction, the emergence of a stronger opposition, and a risk to lose his political (and thereby 
economic) power to contestants, turned Kuchma to an eager supporter of the idea of empowering 
parliamentarian branch at the expense of presidential. The reform had to prevent giving too much 
power to Yushchenko and to secure the interests of Kuchma‟s “party of power” by increasing the 
powers of the parliament. The last thing it had to ensure was the proper constitutional system of 
Ukraine. This exercise removed the danger of authoritarianism, but also created a political deadlock 
leading to continuous “war” for power.  
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The situation with reforming the current constitution does not differ that much from Kuchma‟s 
approach: Ukrainian political elites try to design constitution so that it suits their own objectives. 
The recent proposal of Yushchenko is a good example.  
As it has been described in the paragraph 6.3, current Ukrainian constitution contains a number of 
shortcomings, such as unclear definition of the roles and competences of the president, the 
parliament and the government, provisions about the imperative mandate, provisions regarding 
prosecutor general and the ombudsman.   
Besides a number of improvements (cf. paragraph 6.3), the draft contains elements that aim at 
strengthening of presidential powers. It maintains a semi-presidential system with a double 
executive and do not remove the areas of potential conflict between the president and the 
government. (Venice Commission Opinion, 2009) Yushchenko‟s proposal actually revived some of 
the old ideas of Kuchma dating back to 2000 and 2003, such as the establishment of bicameral 
parliament with extensive powers of the senate. Interestingly, Yushchenko, being in opposition to 
Kuchma at that time, was strongly against this idea. But as a president he finds it useful.    
According to the draft amendments, senate has extensive powers regarding appointment of key 
figures. For example, it appoints on president‟s proposal general prosecutor, heads of security 
services, head of the national bank and of the central election commission. The senate should be 
elected for a term of six years, and in contrast to chamber of deputies, it cannot be dissolved 
before its term expires.     
The president‟s powers are not only preserved, but also extended. The president gets the powers to 
dismiss general prosecutor, to appoint and dismiss heads of the local state administrations without 
consulting the cabinet of ministers. He can also decide on initiation of referendums about changes 
to the constitution (Instytut Polityky 2009). Furthermore, the draft contains highly questionable 
provisions about giving incumbent presidents the status of everlasting senators. In this way, 
Yushchenko attempts to secure his own future after his presidency term expires.  
Representatives of BYuT, PoR and Lytvyn Bloc expressed their objections to this draft proposal. 
In light of the upcoming elections and the low ratings of Yushchenko38, any serious consideration 
of the draft is possible in the nearest future.     
Yushchenko‟s proposal demonstrates that tradition of designing institutions which suit own 
objectives is persistent in Ukraine. Yushchenko is more preoccupied with a strengthening of his 
powers as a president and securing his own future in case of not being re-elected for the second 
                                               
38 According to a survey carried out by the TNS Ukraine in December 2009, only 4.2 % of respondents would vote for 
Yushchenko, while Yanukovych and Tymoshenko are supported by 26.3 % and 18.6%, respectively. (TNS Ukraine, 28 
December 2009, http://tns-ua.com) 
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term. The question of creating a constitution with an effective system of checks and balances is 
definitely not his first priority.    
 
6.3.3 State apparatus as an instrument of control   
The legacy of Kuchma‟s oligarchic and neo-patrimonial state with its systemic components of patronage 
and clientelism, in which officials hold positions in state institutions with powers which are formally 
defined, but exercise those powers not as a form of public service but as private property 
counteract any attempts to implement administrative reform. In Ukraine, “relationships with others 
likewise fall into the patrimonial pattern of vassal and lord, rather than the rational-legal one of subordinate and 
superior, and behaviour is correspondingly devised to display a personal status rather than to perform an official 
function” (Zimmer 2008:277).    
Despite numerous declarations of post-Orange Ukrainian governments about their determination 
to reform the system of public administration, no progress actually has taken place. The beginning 
of the reforms dates back to 1998, when Kuchma issued his directive on implementation of the 
concept of administrative reform in Ukraine. The 10 years of attempts to introduce reforms in 
public administration, including the civil service, has not brought results.  
The roots of the lack of progress in this respect can be found in the culture of distributing 
positions in public administration as a form of payment for political and financial support. As the 
Orange revolution failed to cut the intertwined connection between politics and private interest, it 
has in the same way failed to change the entrenched practice of patronage and clientelism. Positions in 
public administration are used by patrons as a “currency” to reward loyalty of their supporters 
(Burda 2009).   
The post-Orange leaders declared their determination to reform public administrations and to fight 
corruption.  For example, Yushchenko in his 2004 election programme declared, that he is 
determined “to force public administration to work for people and to fight corruption”, and in order to achieve 
this he will “dismiss all the corrupt bureaucrats in the executive, and will appoint honest and decent professionals” 
and “abolish unnecessary administrative structures and reduce the number of servants.”39 (Yushchenko Action 
Plan "Ten Steps towards People", 2004)  In the same spirit Tymoshenko, when appointed as a 
prime minister in 2007, proclaimed in her speech, that she will “reduce the number of all unnecessary 
bureaucratic cadres ... and the number of deputy ministers”. (Narodna Pravda 2008). 
But what has actually happened since 2005 is the increase of the number of public servants. Thus, 
according to information for the Main Department of Civil Service of Ukraine, the number of state 
                                               
39 Yushchenko Action Plan "Ten Steps towards People", 2004, available at http://www.cvk.gov.ua 
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employees increased with 40,000 since 2004 and the total number of employees were more than 
290,000 at the end of 2008 (cf. Table 6).  
 
Table 5. Dynamics of change in the number of public servants in Ukraine 2004-2008 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Totally in 
Ukraine 
 251 471  257 112  265 703  276 599  290 765 
Chiefs Total number of 
persons 
67 114 66 265 66 775    71 385    75 443 
% of the total 
number  
26,70% 25,80% 25,13% 25,81% 25,95% 
Specialists  Total number of 
persons 
 184 357  190 847  198 928  205 214  215 322 
% of the total 
number 
73,30% 74,20% 74,87% 74,19% 74,05% 
Source: Main Department of Civil Service of Ukraine, http://www.guds.gov.ua 
 
In practice, a large amount of legal acts has been devoted to dismissals of deputies of heads and 
heads of various governmental institutions. Different institutions within the executive have been 
dismantled, renamed, restructured and re-established. According to some estimations, every 15th 
act, adopted by the government in the period December 2007 – May 2008 was devoted to 
abolishment of minister deputies‟ posts in various ministries. (Narodna Pravda 2008) But dismissals 
and abolishments were followed by new appointments and creation of new executive institutions.  
In this way, exploiting the rhetoric of reforming administration and fight of corruption, each new 
government removed the people of their predecessors and appointed their loyal supporters, if 
necessary creating new agencies with this aim.  
In light of the above, it becomes quite clear, why the reform of local self-government is towing. 
The weakness of institutions of local self-government and the competency to appoint and to 
dismiss heads of local state administrations is vitally important for preservation of power vertical 
system and for securing the interests of the ruling elites throughout the country. 
 
6.3.4 Public service broadcasting: undermining secure media environment  
The law about the system of public system broadcasting was adopted in 1997, but the independent 
public service broadcaster has never been established in Ukraine. Since then a number of various 
legislative drafts has been proposed, with the recently proposed amendments (cf. paragraph 5.2), 
which were overturned by the parliament.  
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Ukrainian political leaders are not tired to declare the need to establish an independent public 
broadcasting system. It has been among the promises of the Orange coalition in 2004. But nothing 
has changed since. Lately, on the occasion of celebration of a 10th anniversary of BYuT in summer 
2009, Tymoshenko once again declared, that the first thing she will do, if she becomes president in 
2010, is establish the public service television and radio. She underlined that BYuT has all resources 
for this, as her party, Andri Shevhcenko, has already prepared proposals, ready to be adopted 
(Krasnova 2009).  
But the problem is that the draft law prepared by Shevchenko in practise proposes the 
establishment of “public service broadcaster” to be created within the framework of Cabinet of 
Ministers, financed from the state budget and which is totally responsible to the executive branch. 
Thus, the draft law has nothing to do with the creation of an independent media broadcaster, but 
provides for the restructuring of state broadcasting institutions and renaming it to something more 
“democratic”.  
Tug-of-war about the public service broadcasting reveals the structural problem of Ukraine in line 
with the described above – the misuse of the state broadcasting system40 in own interests. The 
result is lack of political will to do anything about it. But can it be otherwise in a country, where 
elections take place almost twice a year, in which media play and enormous role.   
With dismantling of the state television and introduction of an independent broadcasting the 
convenient and secure rules of political existence in the media environment will disappear. This 
may have suicidal consequences for some politicians, as today in Ukraine the appearance of 
political leaders on state television, regional governors on regional state channels and heads of local 
state administrations on local state channels is often conditioned by political (not informational) 
necessity. One observer exactly notes: “No Ukrainian government, which has been grown up on values of 
soviet party nomenclatura, will ever refuse the state media resource. ... The existence of state media – is a situation of 
mutual cover-up, when everybody is satisfied with the situation” (Samohvalov 2009).   
Even worse, the idea of public service broadcasting in not only unpopular among politicians, it 
lacks enthusiastic supporters among journalists. In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, the 
high expectations of the democratic break-through in the media environment fell to the grounds.  
Though, representatives of Ukrainian civil society organisation have been rather active in 
promotion of the idea and elaboration of legislative proposals. For example, in 2005 a number of 
media civil society organisations joined into coalition “Public Service Broadcasting” – the initiative 
supported by the EU and Renaissance Foundation. The work of this civil society coalition has been 
                                               
40 There are 30 state-owned broadcasting companies, among them central National Television and Radio Company, 
regional, local and municipal broadcasters, who are owned and funded from state budget. 
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quite productive: in close co-operation with parliamentary media committee, and national 
commission in charge of questions of freedom of speech and information, it elaborated 
conceptions for programming, financing, and editorial politics of the future public service 
broadcaster. The draft was presented to the parliament in 2007, passed in the first reading, but 
overturned in the second, due to political disagreements.    
 
6.3.5 Conclusion 
The entrenched features of Ukrainian political structures and processes, such as oligarchization, 
patronage and klientelism create a political system in which “consecutive Ukrainian governments and 
presidents demonstrated their preparedness to subordinate the general societal welfare that derives from reform to self-
serving politics” (Wolczuk 2003: 125). As it has been shown above, the historical legacies inherited 
from the soviet era, and post-soviet development created an environment in which formal 
institutions are designed and redesigned in such a way that they secure the interests of those who 
are in power. The blurring of public and private interests leads to the misuse of state apparatus in 
any possible way. In such a situation, the main function of public administration becomes 
distorted: it does not provide an effective decision-making framework to address societal problems, 
but is reduced to serving the interests of rent-seeking circles. The result is - corruption, starting 
from the highest levels of political beaumonde and penetrating all levels of public life. Thus, any 
attempts to change the system will naturally run into reluctant opposition. Political stakes are high, 
as inevitable consequence of democratic reforms is potential lost of political and economic power.   
 
After presenting the main features of the Ukrainian political structures and processes, it is 
interesting to look at the societal level to find out whether the Ukrainian population sees itself as 
European and whether it is capable of influencing the developments at the level of political elites.     
 
6.4 European identification, participation traditions and civil society  
Participatory political culture and vibrant civil society are extremely important for the prospects of 
democratic development of a society. In relation to the EU‟s possibilities to encourage democratic 
transformations, the characteristics of Ukrainian society are of a great interest. In the following I 
will discuss the features of Ukrainian political culture, such as national identity (degree of its 
Europeaness) and participatory characteristics of citizens (participants, subjects and parochials) (cf. 
paragraph 3.2 and 3.3). Afterwards the existence of a vibrant civil society will be assessed. I will 
thereby answer 7th and 8th research questions. 
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6.4.1 European identification 
The formation of Ukrainian identity has been influenced by its turbulent historical development as 
the quasi-state entity of the Cossack Hetmanate, nationalist governments of 1917-1919, the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the contemporary independent Ukrainian state. Ukraine 
has never experienced fully independence before 1917, when the short period of national 
governments was interrupted by a soviet regime in the 1920s. Due to changing geographical 
boundaries, which took their final shape in the 1940-1950s41, Ukraine is characterised by multiple 
ethno-linguistic entities and regional fragmentation.  
The Ukrainian prolonged statelessness and the history of division and redivision of multiple zones 
of domination “contributed to the inconsistent and fragmented nature of Ukrainian political culture”, which is 
expressed in its “ambilvalent-conformist” character (Molchanov 2002: 184). The ambivalence of 
Ukrainian political culture is manifested in the tendency of the population to support mutually 
contradictory choices. This can be a possible explanation of the simultaneous support of the idea 
of Ukraine‟s EU membership, and definition of cooperation with Russia as a priority for Ukrainian 
foreign policy (cf. paragraph 6.1.2). 
Political ambivalence is reinforced by the regional fragmentation of Ukraine. The differences 
between nationally conscious, pro-European, western regions and the pro-Russian, anti-European, 
eastern and southern regions are profound. Historical legacies are of tremendous importance in 
this connection. While western Ukraine constituted a part of Poland and the Habsburg Empire, the 
east for centuries was dominated by Russia. Consequently, the differences in language use – 
Ukrainian in the west, and Russian in the east. During the soviet era, the eastern oblasts enjoyed 
rapid industrialisation, but the western oblasts were allowed to continue a predominantly 
agricultural development. After the demise of the Soviet Union, the western population quickly 
reoriented its activities to the bordering Central European countries, but the east remained hostage 
of its Russian connections.  
Regional divisions are projected on the contemporary Ukrainian politics: the population of western 
and central Ukraine supports the pro-European, nationalistic parties (Our Ukraine, BYuT), and the 
eastern and southern population is a stronghold for pro-Russian political parties (PoR, CPU). The 
schism has been clearly demonstrated during the 2004 presidential elections. 
Historical development highly influenced the formation of Ukrainian identity.  Since 2002, only a 
stable third of the Ukrainian population identifies itself as being European and as belonging to the 
                                               
41 Western provinces were included in 1940s and Krym in 1954.   
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culture and history of the European community. Over half of the Ukrainians (61%) reject their 
belonging to the European community. (White et al. 2002; Razumkov Centre 2008).  
There are clear regional divisions in respect to the strength of European identification of the 
Ukrainians. The biggest share of the population (52%), that identify themselves as European, lives 
in westerns oblasts. In other regions, non-European identification dominates. On the average, in 
central and eastern Ukraine, around 30% of the population feel themselves as being European, and 
65% are of the opinion that they are not Europeans. The southern oblasts show a bit different 
distribution: around 35% identify themselves as belonging to Europe and this share has been 
growing since September 2005, and 56% do not feel themselves as European (see annex 5).  
The degree of European identification is also different among different age groups. Young people 
(18-29 years) feel themselves as European more often than other age groups. In 2008, 37% of 
young people identified themselves as belonging to European culture (Razumkov Centre 2008).     
 
6.4.2 Participation traditions  
“I am not from this town, I know nothing.”  
(Ukrainian proverb)  
 
The historical experiences and memory of past tragedies affected civic behaviour of the  
Ukrainians. Accommodation to shifting environments was necessary in order to survive as a 
human being. This has been important under Polish, Hapsburgs, Russians, Soviets, and in the 
context of total economic and political dismay of post-soviet independence. It is a natural human 
reaction to isolate oneself from dangerous and threatening environment. Therefore, some kind of 
security could be found in local, parochial, self-sufficient communities. The other choice was to 
escape, which is demonstrated by the presence of large Ukrainian diasporas around the world. 
Those few and desperate, who chose revolt, were cruelly crashed down or silently eliminated, 
which worked as a strong deterrent effect on others. All this contributed to the entrenched culture 
of survivalism with strong individualistic and localist trends in Ukraine.  
Orientations towards local and known functioned as a suitable framework of relationships with 
external authorities, as “a kind of a dike against the tide of national and social oppression” (Molchanov 
2002: 194). As a result, a high level of dependency on immediate social surroundings has 
developed, which is persisting nowadays. The side-effect of this dependency is an inclination to 
reject formal authorities and to rely on personal and social connections.  
This feature reinforces the oligarchical and patrimonial character of Ukrainian politics, where 
dependence on patronage and services of the powerful is the core element. The relationships are 
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guided by the logic of: who is who, and who is connected to whom (family ties, friend connections, 
neighbours, fellows etc.). This is what works, and not the formal, complicated and contradictory 
rules. The former makes one‟s life easier, the latter complicates. Especially in the impoverished 
economy, when basic survival and wellbeing is at the stake. According to estimations, in the 1990s 
half of the Ukrainian population lived below poverty line. The situation gradually improved and in 
2009 the share of population living below poverty line constituted about 25%.  To compare, the 
rate of poverty varies between 10% and 23% in the EU countries. (Kovalenko & Laschenko 2009; 
Science Daily 2008)  
The culture of survivalism and dependency has contributed to the low level of political engagement 
of the population and a weak civil society. Low levels of engagement have been further reinforced 
by the troubled democratic transition in the country. There has been a wide-range disbelief in one‟s 
own capabilities to change the situation. For example, during elections one could often read “Vote, 
or do not vote – you will get a fig anyway” on buildings, fences, staircases etc.  
Voter turnout in Ukraine has been shifting. The highest voter mobilisation was during the Orange 
Revolution (over 77%), which fell in the following parliamentary elections (around 59% in 2006 
and 58% in 2007), demonstrating general lack of trust and interest in elections among the 
Ukrainian population. Voter turnout in Ukraine is much lower than in the established European 
democracies. According to a global survey carried out by the International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the average voter turnout in European countries in 1945-1997 
was close to 80%42 .      
 
                                               
42 IDEA Voter turnout 1945-1999: A global survey, http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter_turnout3.cfm 
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Figure 3. Voter turnout in Ukraine 1998-200743 
 
Another indicator of the level of participatory political culture is the interest of the population in 
politics, membership in political parties and civil society organizations.  
According to a 2008 survey, the majority of the Ukrainian population (55%) are interested in 
politics. A bit lower share of the respondents regularly follows the developments in political life 
(41%) and has stable political beliefs (40%). Only 4.7% of the respondents hold membership in 
political parties. (Razumkov Centre 2008d: 30)     
A telling characteristic of the level of civic activity of the Ukrainian population is revealed, if rates 
of societal support of the governmental institutions are compared with the readiness of population 
to engage in protest actions against government. Thus, in 2008, 20.7% of the respondents 
supported activities of Ukrainian government, 36.9% had no position and 30.7% did not support 
governmental activities. Regional divisions are obvious: in western oblasts the population was 
predominantly supportive, in the centre people were predominantly undecided, and in eastern and, 
especially, in southern oblasts the population did not support the government. In contrast to the 
high level of dissatisfaction with the government, only 24% of the respondents declared their 
willingness and 57% had no intention to participate in protest actions. Interestingly, low levels of 
readiness to participate in protests are demonstrated in almost all oblasts, with the exception of the 
south, where people turn to be more ready to protest. (Razumkov Centre 2008d)  
A predominant majority of the Ukrainian population demonstrates a high level of understanding of 
the importance of civil participation (61%) and positively assesses own abilities to civil activity 
(53%). But only 11% of the respondents are actually taking part in the activities of civil society 
                                               
43 Source: own compiled data from Central Election Commission of Ukraine, http://www.cvk.gov.ua  
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organisations (Razumkov Centre 2008d: 38).  44% of all respondents explain their motivation of 
non-participation in civil society as lack of necessity. And if asked, what could be possible reasons 
for them to engage in civil activity, following gets the highest ranks: possibility to obtain benefits 
for oneself or for one‟s family (37%); and if life, health or wellbeing of one‟s family becomes 
endangered (29%). Only 14% of the respondents would engage in civil activities, if it would be for 
the benefit of the whole society (Razumkov Centre 2008d: 41).               
This survey data shows that survivalist and accommodating features of Ukrainian political culture 
are persisting. Furthermore, it shows that the Ukrainian population lacks understanding of the 
importance of participation in civil society activities as a way of creation of all-societal protection 
mechanisms. As soon as one‟s or one‟s family wellbeing is secured, Ukrainians see no reason to 
bother. Such societal passivity and indifference enable vast possibilities for unjust treatment of 
others at the expense of one‟s own security.  
The low levels of societal support of the current government can be attributed to the societal 
assessment of the government‟s primary goals. The predominant majority of population is 
convinced that the government‟s primary aim is not to find solutions for socio-economic problems 
of the Ukrainian society, but to provide for the rent-seeking interests of big capitals (oligarchs). It 
should be noted, that this conviction has not changed since 2005 (Razumkov Centre 2008d: 36). 
Thus, the Ukrainian society demonstrates rather high levels of political awareness and keeps an eye 
on the developments at the political arena. Nevertheless, the deep entrenched features of 
survivalism and dependency condition low levels of political participation, which is demonstrated 
by low levels of membership in civil society organisations and general unwillingness to engage in 
protest activities. In terms of Almond‟s classification, Ukrainian political culture can be 
characterised as lying in-between subject and participatory types.      
 
6.4.3 Civil society 
Historical conditions and the described above features of survivalism and dependency of political 
culture determined development of a rather weak civil society in Ukraine. Despite some positive 
developments in recent years, the influence of civil society is limited.  
Civil society, including non-governmental organisations (NGO), is a new development in Ukraine. 
Even though its roots can be traced back several centuries, the existing forms of early civil society 
organisations were limited to intellectual circles. For example, in the late 19th century small 
discussions groups (kruzhky) emerged, which provided forums for intellectuals to debate on issues 
of nationhood (Kolodij 2002).  
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Later developments were closely connected with the historical developments of different regions, 
such as Bukovyna, Transcarpathia and Crimea, which had differing experiences of state-society 
relations and developed varying political sub-cultures. Under the Soviet regime all attempts of 
“alternative thinking” were suppressed, which meant, that civil society had to be created from the 
scratch in the independent Ukraine. Some gradual development of civil society has taken place 
since then, but, on the whole, Ukrainian civil society remains relatively weak.  
Even though the number of civil society organisations has steadily grown since the 1990s, the 
problem of securing the breadth of citizen participation remains intact. According to a survey, 
among the existing civil society organisations in 2006, 17% were registered prior to 1996 and 25% 
were registered since 2003. While this does not take into account those organisations, which 
became inactive in the period, the numbers indicate a growing tendency (Stewart 2009). It should 
be noted in this respect that the Orange Revolution did not bring cardinal changes: no boom in the 
number of civil society organisations has been observed.  
Membership in civil society organisations remain to be restricted to a small proportion of 
Ukrainians, as they prefer to engage in civil society activities outside organised bodies. Since 1995, 
over 80% of the population has consistently reported that they do not possess membership in any 
civil society organisation (Stewart 2009). But this does not mean that Ukrainians do not engage in 
civic activity, but that their engagement in recent acquired mostly spontaneous character rather 
than formal organisational membership. This is a positive sign, as it indicates, that civil society 
organisations have the potential to create foundations for more extensive societal participation. 
Furthermore, in 2005-2006 another positive tendency has been noted, namely, the increase in 
membership. Organisations experience the growth in volunteers, the major part of which is young 
people.  
Due to the scarce national sources of funding, Ukrainian NGOs are heavily dependent on foreign 
funding. The primary funding source for many NGOs in the 1990s and the early 2000s came from 
abroad. First, US assistance and later the EU and other European countries were the main donors. 
Today, the funding sources are becoming more diversified, but the grants from international 
organisations are still the greatest funding resource Thus, in 2002-2005 foreign funding represented 
32-38% of NGO‟s income, 19-21% came from business and the rest from the state budget and 
charitable contributions (Stewart 2009).  
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Studies show, that the main problems of civil society are funding and training opportunities 
(Kaunterpart Creative Center 2006: 75). This is aggravated by the exit of some foreign 
organisations providing support for NGOs44, which leads to less foreign funding.  
As regards national sources of financing, some Ukrainian big capitals (e.g. Viktor Pinchuk and 
Rinat Akhmetov) established foundations that provide funding of various social projects. The aim 
of these foundations is to improve image of their founders through support of various social 
projects, which makes them reluctant to fund projects with a “watchdog” function.   
The amounts of funding from the governmental structures are limited. Few NGOs receive funding 
from state, and the volume of this help is marginal. In 2005 only 27% of NGOs received financial 
support from the state, and for 31% of them the support received under $ 500 pr. year 
(Kaunterpart Creative Center 2006: 39). Thus, foreign funding is of greatest concern for future 
development of civil society in Ukraine.  
There are hopes among Ukrainian NGOs that the EU will become more active in its support of 
civil society through the ENP. At the same time, it has been noted that the complex and 
bureaucratic character of EU‟s grant procedures pose a great challenge for many Ukrainian civil 
society organisations as they lack the necessary professional knowledge and experience in this 
regard, which restricts their possibilities to apply for EU grants.        
While the prominent role of the civil society organisations in the Orange revolution has been 
widely recognised, their influence on the government remained low. Even though the dialog with 
the government intensified since the Orange revolution, it is accompanied by significant problems, 
such the lack of experience in organising such dialog and the lack of interest on the part of 
governmental institutions in organising such a dialog45. Since the Orange Revolution, the ability of 
civil society organisations to empower citizens and to participate in processes of political decision-
making has increased. But its efforts to hold governmental agencies accountable have limited 
effect.         
Thus, despite a number of positive developments in civil society sectors, such as the growth in 
their number, the ability to empower citizens, better possibilities to participate in governmental 
decision making processes, they still represent only a small group of the population, their activities 
are underpinned by the commitment of a small group of enthusiasts and they are highly dependent 
on foreign funding.    
                                               
44 The UK Department for International Development (DFID) plan to terminate its activities in Ukraine once certain 
economic parameters are in place.    
45 In 2006, only 2% of contacts between NGOs and government were initiated by the governmental structures. 
(Kaunterpart Creative Center 2006: 44)   
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6.4.4 Conclusion 
The Ukrainian society demonstrates a low level of European identification as only one third identifies 
themselves as European. There are clear regional differences. The level of European identification 
is highest in the west, which is followed by the centre and the east. Though, in the centre, the 
degree of European identification fell dramatically in 2008 if compared with 2005. The trend is 
unchanged in the Eastern oblasts, whereas in the south the share of population identifying 
themselves with Europe fell in the end of September 2005 and has been steadily growing since. 
Young people demonstrate a higher level of European identification than other age groups. 
Historical experiences determined the development of Ukrainian political culture with deep 
entrenched characteristics of survivalism, adaptation and dependency on personal and social 
connections. This feature reinforces the oligarchical and patrimonial character of Ukrainian politics 
and contributes to the low level of political participation. There is a general disbelief among the 
population about one‟s own capabilities to change something in the society. 
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian population demonstrates high level of interest in political affairs and 
regularly follows the developments on the political arena. But only very few hold membership in 
political parties or involve in the activities of civil society. Ukrainians demonstrate high level of 
indifference to the government activities and low level of readiness to protest. Even though they 
are unsatisfied with the government, they prefer to adapt, not to protest. Thus, the Ukrainian 
political culture can be placed somewhere in-between Almond‟s subject and parochial types.      
Civil society in Ukraine is rather weak and representing only a small share of enthusiasts. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of positive trends towards both growing and strengthening of 
civil society in Ukraine. The number of members in civil society organisations grows, and 
population, especially young people, is getting more and more involved on a voluntary basis. The 
occurrence of the Orange Revolution is a strong confirmation of these positive trends. At the same 
time, civil society organisations in Ukraine are vulnerable. They are heavily dependent on foreign 
funding sources and professional knowledge and experience. The exit of some international donors 
from Ukraine aggravates this situation. There are big hopes about assistance, both financial and 
expert, from the EU‟s side. But the complexity and the bureaucratic character of EU‟s grant 
procedures poses a hindrance for the young and inexperienced Ukrainian civil society.                   
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
In chapter 5 and 6, the Ukraine‟s progress in compliance with the EU‟s requirements regarding 
strengthening of the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, the degree 
of compatibility between the EU‟s offers and Ukrainian expectations, the coherence between the 
EU‟s requirements and priorities of Ukrainian population, the specific characteristics of Ukrainian 
political elites and society have been analysed. On the basis of the findings of the analysis in these 
chapters, in the following the main question of the thesis will be answered:      
 
In terms of national conditions, what are the possibilities and the limitations for the EU’s 
approach to promote democratic reforms in Ukraine? 
 
The overall conclusion of this study is that there are much more limitations than possibilities in the 
Ukrainian context for the EU‟s approach to strengthen the stability and effectiveness of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law in Ukraine.       
 
Mobilising effect of the EU‟s offers – are the carrots big enough? 
The analysis of the attractiveness of the benefits proposed by the EU for the Ukrainian elites and 
society at large reveals a high degree of mismatch regarding the upgrade in scope and intensity of 
political cooperation, deeper economic integration, establishment of a FTA, and a (still 
hypothetical) possibility for Ukraine to join the EU. The Ukrainian population in general is not 
interested in upgrading the scope and intensity of political cooperation with the EU. It is divided 
about further economic integration with the EU and the establishment of a FTA. The views about 
the idea of Ukraine‟s EU membership are divided, and in some oblasts it is even strongly opposed. 
In contrast, Our Ukraine and to a lesser degree BYuT are unsatisfied with “the door is neither 
close nor open”- approach and uncertainty in this respect makes argumentation of the necessity to 
implement reforms rather ambiguous. Thus, the promise of reward in form of more intensive 
political cooperation, deeper economic cooperation and, even the possibility of EU membership, 
will not work as they fail to provide strong motivation for the government to pursue democratic 
reforms in the aim of closer ties with the EU. This is further complicated by the attitudes of the 
Ukrainian population, which means that the strong emphasis on these rewards by a political elite 
will not be supported by the population thereby leading to further aggravation of societal divisions 
and result in the loss of power by the elite in question. 
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On the other hand, the Ukrainian political elites and society are unanimous in their interest in 
Ukraine‟s possibility to participate progressively in the EU policies and programmes promoting 
cultural, educational, environmental, technical and scientific links and in simplification of visa rules 
with future establishment of a visa-free regime. Even more, the societal interest in closer 
educational, environmental, technical and scientific cooperation has been growing in the recent 
years. These rewards are not as ambiguous as those described above, and have the potential to 
facilitate implementation of the reforms. The character of these benefits indicates that the 
Ukrainian society and the elites are more responsive towards those benefits that are tangible in 
everyday life. The abstract meaning of closer cooperation in either political or economic spheres 
can be difficult to translate into practice. This is supported by that fact that a lot of Ukrainians are 
not aware of the actual benefits (positive  or negative) of the deepening of integration with the EU. 
The issue of membership is too complex and is connected to conflicting interests and orientations 
of the Ukrainian elites and population to be able to play a positive mobilizing role.   
     
Legitimacy of demands – unanimity between the EU and the Ukrainian population  
Salience of the EU‟s priorities for the Ukrainian population (costs of compliance) 
If the EU requirements coincide with the national priorities regarding societal problems which has 
to be addressed at first, then the governments would be under a high pressure to comply with the 
requirements as the costs of non-compliance would be high. 
There is a high level of disagreement in the EU‟s views about the priorities for reforms and the 
assessments of the Ukrainian population. The EU regards democratic reforms as a prerequisite for 
solving socio-economic issues. The Ukrainians‟ priorities are ranked in the reverse order. Thus, 
Ukrainians attach the low priority to the necessity to ensure the democratic conduct of elections, to 
the constitutional reform and to strengthening of the local self-government in Ukraine. Freedom of 
the media and administrative reform is at the bottom of the priority list. The top priority for the 
Ukrainians is solving socio-economic problems. Nevertheless, the only point of unanimity is the 
urgent necessity to fight corruption.  
What is striking is the low level of understanding by the Ukrainian population of the 
interconnectedness between the existence of the effective democratic institutions, clear cut 
definition of responsibilities of constitutional bodies, professional and impartial public 
administration and strong self-government, on the one hand, and the fight of corruption and the 
improvement of the socio-economic situation, on the other hand. The “need for democratic 
reforms” is a popular expression in Ukraine and diligently used by the political establishment. But 
its content is unclear for the population. Therefore, as long as the Ukrainians remain unaware of 
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the actual components of the democratic reforms, the Ukrainian governments will have vast 
possibilities to come up with all possible solutions allegedly directed to fight corruption and to 
improve the socio-economic conditions. This situation determines the low level of legitimacy of 
most of the EU‟s requirements among the Ukrainian population and do not provide powerful 
incentives to the Ukrainian governments to comply with them.  
The high legitimacy of the necessity to fight corruption provides for the possibility to push the 
governments for the compliance with those requirements that have low legitimacy, if the important 
link between the two is recognised by the society. This can eventually change the order of societal 
priorities so that the democratic reforms will be ranked higher.  
Furthermore, the low legitimacy of democratic reforms is aggravated by the mismatch in the 
understanding of what presents the main problem of Ukraine in relation to European integration. 
The EU points out at democratic shortcomings, whereas the Ukrainians are convinced that it is the 
low level of economic development.  
The low credibility of the EU as a promoter of democratic reforms in Ukraine is restricted by the 
general understanding among the Ukrainian population of the EU‟s primary goals. A very small 
proportion of Ukrainians actually believe that the EU wants to support democracy in Ukraine. 
Instead, the majority is of the opinion that the EU is predominantly interested in exploiting 
Ukrainian natural resources and exporting goods to the Ukrainian market.         
 
Self and other categorisation – the Ukrainian political elites and society   
The generally low level of European identification of the Ukrainian population as being European, 
and the societal regional divisions and divisions among the political elites in this respect complicate 
the process of adoption of the European rules and norms. The logic “we should do this in this way 
because we are European and therefore should act as the Europeans” does not always work. Instead, the lack 
of progress in reforms is explained by “they do this in Europe, but we are different” and therefore it is 
accepted to have such non-European rules as the constitutional provisions about the imperative 
mandate.  
Diverging identifications and orientations at the societal level and at the level of political elites 
creates the situation when it is difficult to achieve consensus about the common solutions, thus 
hindering implementation of the necessary reforms. European identity is simply not strong enough 
to provide guidance for action and to overcome the wish to maintain the political power, as the 
costs of losing it are too high. Though, the higher levels of European identification among the 
population in the western oblasts and the young people (18-29) provides for the possibility to 
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create “centres of demand” among these groups, which would seek compliance with the 
requirements.         
 
Costs of adaptation – the Ukrainian political elites  
The soviet legacies, the neo-patrimonial character of the Ukrainian state with its systemic elements of 
oligachization, patronage and klientelism, create a system in which public and private interests are 
blurred and where state apparatus is misused in private interests. Formal institutions are designed 
and redesigned in such a way that they secure interests of those in power. The functions of public 
administration become distorted, as it is no longer focused on providing public goods and finding 
solutions to societal problems but is turned into an instrument for self-enriching activities. In this 
context political power means economic power. The inherent element of this system is corruption, 
which starts at the highest levels of political decision-making and penetrates all levels of public 
institutions.  
Implementation of the democratic reforms which aim at creation of an effective system of checks 
and balances, professionalization and transparency of public administration, mechanisms for 
holding the government accountable for its actions have undermining consequences for the 
Ukrainian political elites. Therefore, despite repeated declarations about their determinacy to 
implement the constitutional and public administration reform, to strengthen local self-
government, to create an independent system of public service broadcasting and to fight 
corruption no progress can be observed, quite on the contrary. Thus, there is a close circle which is 
reinforced by the ingrained features of political structures and processes that make costs of 
compliance too high as the inevitable consequence of implementation of the democratic reforms is 
the highly probable lost of political and economic power.              
 
Society as agent of change  
Historical experiences conditioned the development of the Ukrainian political culture with the deep 
engraved features of survivalism, adaptation, dependency and individualism. These features 
contribute to the low levels of political participation of the Ukrainian population and the weak civil 
society. Only few hold membership in political parties or in civil society organizations. The 
Ukrainians are not interested in the activities of the government and are reluctant to engage in 
protests. There is a widely shared disbelief in one‟s own capability to change something in the 
society, which is manifested by the sceptical position towards elections. Nevertheless, the 
Ukrainian society demonstrates high levels of political interest and is keen on the developments at 
the political arena.  
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The civil society organisations are rather a new phenomenon in Ukraine as it had to be created 
from scratch in the post-soviet period. The civil society organisations lack the breadth of societal 
representation and are driven by a small share of enthusiasts. In spite of this, a number of positive 
developments can be observed. Thus, the number of members in civil society organisation grows 
and the Ukrainian population, especially the young people, are getting more and more engaged in 
the activities of civil society, often on the voluntary basis. The event of the Orange Revolution is a 
powerful confirmation of these developments and would not be possible without the active 
participation of civil society and the population at large. Since the Orange Revolution the ability of 
civil society to empower people and to participate in the processes of political decision-making has 
increased.      
Nevertheless, the civil society remains to be vulnerable due to its high level of dependency on 
foreign funding. This situation is aggravated by the exit of some international donors from 
Ukraine. The civil society is still rather young and lacks professional knowledge and experience. It 
is not yet able to hold government institutions accountable. All these factors limit its power of 
penetration.  
In terms of national conditions, the possibilities and limitations of the EU‟s approach to promote 
democratic reforms in Ukraine are summarised in table 7 below. 
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Table 6. The possibilities and limitations for the EU‟s approach to promote democratic reforms in 
Ukraine 
Variables Possibilities Limitations 
EU’s benefits Simplification of visa rules and 
visa-free travel 
Promise of upgrade in the scope and 
intensity of political cooperation 
 
Possibility to participate 
progressively in the EU policies 
and programmes promoting 
educational, environmental, 
technical, scientific and cultural 
links 
Participation in the EU‟s internal market, 
continued reduction of trade barriers, 
further economic integration, including 
establishment of a FTA 
 
Perspective of Ukraine‟s EU membership 
EU’s 
requirements  
High level of legitimacy of the 
EU‟s requirement to fight 
corruption 
 
  
Low and very low level of legitimacy of 
the EU‟s requirements regarding 
democratic conduct of elections, freedom 
of the media, the need for constitutional 
and administrative reforms and the 
necessity to strengthen local self 
government 
Low level of belief among the Ukrainian 
population that the EU is actually 
interested in promotion of democratic 
reforms 
Self and other 
categorisation 
of the 
Ukrainian 
political elites 
and population  
Relatively higher level of 
European identification in western 
oblasts and among the young 
people  
Low level of European 
orientation/identification among the 
political elites and the population 
Political 
structures and 
processes 
 
- 
 
The ingrained features of political 
structures and processes, such as 
oligachization, patronage and klientelism 
with the inherent corruption  
Participation 
traditions  
High level of interest in political 
developments  
Political culture of survivalism, 
adaptation, dependency and 
individualism and low levels of political 
participation 
Young people are more willing to 
engage 
Civil society  Positive trends of continuous 
growing and strengthening of civil 
society organisations  
High level of dependency on foreign 
funding, low level of professionalism and 
lack of experience  
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1. Complex Socialization Model46 
 
 
 
                                               
46 Adapted from Flockhart 2005: 45. 
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Annex 2. Regional divisions in societal support of Ukraine’s membership 
in the EU47  
 
 
 
                                               
47 Source: Razumkov Centre (2008) Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona, no. 6 (100), p. 48, available at 
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD100_ukr.pdf, 
76.3
71.1 70.6 69.1
62.8 64.1 63.2
69.2 68.6 70.4
75.7
70.7
77.0
6.3 11.0 9.3 10.0
17.0 17.2 15.4 14.9 12.9 11.5 10.4 12.8 8.6
17.4 17.9 20.1 20.9 20.2 18.8
21.4
15.9 18.5 18.1 13.8 16.5 14.4
Does Ukraine need to join the EU? 
% of  respondents, western oblasts
Yes No Difficult to answer
57.5
63.4
59.8 59.9
44.5
56.0 54.1 53.5 55.7 55.5
58.9 57.9 56.4
22.6
1.2
17.9
25.7
29.5
25.1
20.4
26.5 24.4 26.9 22.9 24.9 23.5
19.9 18.2
22.3
14.4
26.0
19.0
25.5
20.0 19.8 17.6 18.2 17.2 20.1
Does Ukraine need to join the EU? 
% of  respondents, central oblasts
Yes No Difficult to answer
 98 
 
 
 
 
 
37.0 35.5
30.4
34.9
24.1
39.2
38.0
41.9 40.9
30.4
43.8 40.8
33.8
40.6 42.0 40.0
47.4
56.3
38.6
44.2
37.4 37.7
47.2
38.4 34.5
43.3
22.4 22.5
29.6
17.7 19.7
22.3
17.8
20.7 21.4 22.4
17.8
24-7 22.9
Does Ukraine need to join the EU? 
% of  respondents, eastern oblasts
Yes No Difficult to answer
34.0
37.4 37.5
42.5
30.3
33.0
37.4
26.8
36.2
27.2
39.6
32.9 36.8
48.7
43.0 40.5
35.5
43.0
51.5 49.7 52.0
38.1
62.8
48.5 47.8 47.0
17.3 19.6
22.0 22.0
26.7
15.5
12.9
21.2
25.7 10.0
11.9
19.3
16.2
Does Ukraine need to join the EU? 
% of  respondents, southern oblasts
Yes No Difficult to answer
 99 
 
 
Annex 3. Regional division of oblasts to west, centre, south and east48   
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
48 Source: Razumkov Centre, http://www.uceps.org 
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Annex 4. Support rates of Ukraine’s EU membership compared to 
preferred foreign policy directions (the EU and Russia)49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
49 Source: Compiled data from Razumkov Centre (2008) Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona, no. 6 (100), p. 48, available at 
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD100_ukr.pdf 
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Annex 5. European identification of Ukrainian population 2005-200850 
 
 
 
                                               
50 Source: Compiled data from Razumkov Centre (2008) Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona, no. 6 (100), p. 54,  available at 
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/files/category_journal/NSD100_ukr.pdf 
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